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In this paper we use a unique dataset that combines spatial detailed information on conflict 
events and on households' activity, to show a positive and significant correlation between 
violent conflict and entrepreneurship in Afghanistan. We build spatial and IV identifications 
to estimate the effect of different measures of conflict on the investment in a range of private 
economic activities of nearby households. The results consistently show that the level of 
conflict, its impact, and to a lesser extent its frequency, increase the probability that a 
household engages in self-employment activities with lower capital intensity and in activities 
related to subsistence agriculture, and reduce the probability of investing in higher capital 
self-employment. Overall, by increasing entrepreneurship, conflict pushes the country 
towards a regressive structural change. However, the magnitude of most of the effects is quite 
small. The paper contributes to a literature that, due to data constraints and identification 
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1 Introduction
The relationship between conflict, economic development, and private economic activity
(PEA) is still a puzzling one, despite the recent increase in studies investigating the mi-
croeconomic impacts of conflict. First, violent conflict has a significant negative effect
on low-income countries’ economic growth.1 At the microeconomic level violent conflict
reduces the incentives to invest in entrepreneurial activities by destroying physical and
human capital, increasing risks, lowering expected returns, reducing labour supply via
displacement and reduced education, and disrupting markets, institutions, and social net-
works.2
Second, entrepreneurial activity is one key determinant of economic development.3
Reduced investments and entrepreneurship have a negative effect on output and employ-
ment. If, as generally understood, unemployment contributes to fuelling the conflicting
armies (e.g. Iyer and Santos, 2012), a country experiencing violent conflict may enter a
vicious cycle of conflict, reduced PEA, reduced labour demand, increased migration and
enrolment into conflict, reduced labour supply, and further reduced economic activity. The
reduced economic activity may contributes to fuelling this cycle.4
Third, there is evidence showing that in in-conflict countries there are more people
employed in conflict areas than in non-conflict areas (e.g. Iyer and Santos, 2012). And
there is also growing evidence that entrepreneurship, and more in general PEA, is resilient
or even increases in the aftermath of conflicts.5
How do we reconcile the positive effects of business development with the negative
relation between growth and conflict, and the evidence of resilience and increased self-
employment under conflict? One possible explanation is that the negative effect of conflict
on growth is transmitted through distinct micro mechanisms, which are not related to
entrepreneurship, and which are stronger than the positive effect of entrepreneurship on
growth. Another possible explanation is that the observed PEA under conflict is either
non productive, or even harmful for economic growth (Baumol, 1990; Naude´, 2007).
This paper provides with new robust empirical evidence on the above question, recon-
ciling the co-existence of intense conflict, increased PEA, and low output growth. We build
on an unprecedented level of data granularity, substantially refining the identification of
the relationship between conflict and PEA with respect to the literature.
The significant improvements in the identification of the effect of conflict on private
economic activity is achieved in two main ways. First, we construct a rich dataset com-
bining a number of household surveys run in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008 (the
National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA))6 and a rich dataset that maps ge-
ographically and through time the conflict related events that have involved the NATO
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the local population (insurgents and
1See for exampleChen et al. (2008); Collier (1999); Cramer (2006); Hoeﬄer and Reynal-Querol (2003);
Iyer and Santos (2012); World Bank (2011).
2Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006); Bru¨ck and Schindler (2009); Hoeﬄer and Reynal-Querol (2003);
Ravallion (1988).
3See for example Acs (2006); Audretsch et al. (2006); Bandiera et al. (2013); Boettke and Leeson (2009);
Iyigun and Rodrik (2004).
4As suggested, among others, in Collier et al. (2004); Do and Iyer (2010); Elbadawi and Sambanis
(2002); Fearon (2004); Murshed and Gates (2005).
5From different perspectives and countries, see for example Anugwom (2011); Bru¨ck et al. (2013a);
Bullough et al. (2014); Can˜ares (2011); Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007); Justino et al. (2012); Menon and
Rodgers (2013); Nillesen and Verwimp (2010); Peschka et al. (2011).
6For a number of reasons related to the comparability of the different waves our main focus is on the
period from 2005 to 2008.
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civilians). Second, we control for time invariant geographical factors, as well as for the time
variant conflict, constructing a geographical grid defining multiple cells, a spatial unit sig-
nificantly smaller than the district – the smaller administrative boundary in Afghanistan.
This is equivalent to a difference in difference analysis (by year and spatial cell) using a
quasi-panel spatial definition.
Looking at several years of the current violent conflict in Afghanistan we do find robust
evidence that private economic activities do in fact increase in areas where the conflict is
more intense. However, this is a sign of reduced income opportunities, rather than the
other way round. In line with previous studies that have looked at changes in employment
in conflict areas in South Asia (Iyer and Santos, 2012) we find that higher levels of con-
flict events, as well as a higher number of casualties, shift households away from formal
employment to low capital self employment activities, small businesses, and agriculture
related self employment. Self-employment with a higher capital content, instead, decreases
in high conflict areas. Although the general pattern is consistent for a number of conflict
measures (intensity, impact, and frequency), we find interesting differences when we dis-
tinguish among different parties suffering from casualties. In particular, it is the number of
casualties among the civil population driving the results of the impact measure of conflict.
We find less precise estimates when we use self reported violence, which is more markedly
correlated to an increase in self employment in agriculture-related activities. We then
turn to people’s conflict expectations using various measures of yearly peace frequency:
we find that people are affected only by the total number of days of peace, not by the
temporal pattern of conflict, and the effect is in line with that of conflict intensity. Results
are confirmed by the counter-intuitive increase of investment in agricultural inputs under
higher conflict, and by the fact that the increase in low capital intensive self employment
is stronger in high conflict areas that are also far from trade infrastructures. This last
result suggests that the observed self employment is mainly of the subsistence type.
Although our identification strategy is quite robust, we run a number of robustness
checks, among which: we control for lagged measures of conflict intensity, we instrument
the conflict indicator, we contrast a number of definitions of PEA, we control for non
violent military activities (to proxy for the presence of military contractors), and we use
alternative spatial units (larger cells and original districts).
Answering to the question that we address in this paper, our results suggest that
the negative effect of conflict on economic growth observed at the macro level operates
through a vicious structural change: conflict reduces employment opportunities (through
business disinvestment) and increases self employment in activities that have low returns.
With reference to the well established evidence that the relation between economic output
(x-axis) and the ratio of entrepreneurs (y-axis) is concave (Acs, 2006; Wennekers et al.,
2005), violent conflict moves a country leftwards (lower output per capita) and upwards
(more entrepreneurship). We therefore provide an empirical explanation for why more
entrepreneurship is associated with contemporaneous stronger conflict and lower economic
growth.
The rest of the paper is divided in four sections. In the next section (2) we set the
stage for the analysis: we briefly review the literature on the relation between conflict,
PEA and economic development. We also briefly describe the Afghan contest for doing
business. Next, Section 3.2 describes the data, the statistical relation between the conflict
and different types of income choices, and the empirical strategy. We discuss the main
results and the main robustness checks in Section 4. And we conclude with some final con-
siderations in Section 5. The paper includes a long Appendix that details the description
of the data, the construction of the dataset, and some of the robustness checks.
3
2 Backgrounds
Conflict is expected to reduce the incentives to invest in entrepreneurial activities by de-
stroying physical and human capital, increasing risks, lowering expected returns, displac-
ing households, reducing labour, and disrupting markets, institutions, and social networks
(Bru¨ck and Schindler, 2009; Hoeﬄer and Reynal-Querol, 2003; Ravallion, 1988). However,
due to data constraints, only a small number of studies explore the effect of conflict on
private enterprises. In contrast with prediction from theory, there is evidence supporting
both a positive and a negative effect of conflict on PEA Ciarli et al. (2014). This effect
varies with respect to the type of entrepreneurship, the type of conflict, and its dura-
tion (Bru¨ck et al., 2011, 2013b), as well as with the unit of analysis, the sector, and the
indicator of conflict employed in the studies (Ciarli et al., 2014).
In this section we discuss the related literature on (i) entrepreneurship and con-
flict, (ii) entrepreneurship and income growth, (iii) evidence on entrepreneurial choice
in Afghanistan, and (iv) evidence on doing business in Afghanistan.
2.1 Entrepreneurship, Self-Employment and Conflict
With reference to the main intuition that conflict reduces income through a reduction in
firm activities, Ksoll et al. (2013) find the expected negative relationship using exports of
flowers from Kenya. They suggest that the main effect of the conflict is reducing labour
mobility. Narayan and Petesch, eds (2010) finds evidence that many factories that shut
down due to the intensity of the armed conflict do not go back to business even after
security is re-established . Using micro data, Chowdhury (2011) finds that local armed
conflict reduces the probability that a household owns a business in the high conflict region
by 11 percent compared to households elsewhere in Bangladesh. Using a small sample of
firms Vijayakumar (2012) finds that the civil conflict in Sri Lanka had a negative effect on
firms growth in terms of assets value, turnover and employment. According to Deininger
(2003), closeness to civil strife reduced investment and the number of non-agricultural
enterprise start-ups in Uganda between 1992 and 2000. Besley et al. (2011) show that
in Punjab farmers decreased investments in tube wells when violence started. A similar
results is found also in Singh (2013), who mainly refers to farmers’ long term investments.
According to the analysis by Besley et al. (2011), the reduction in investment is affected
mainly by the expected level of conflict persistence. Similarly, Can˜ares (2011) reports
lower investment and growth of firms in conflict areas in The Philippines, and Bullough
et al. (2014) reports a lower entry of firms in conflict zones in Afghanistan.
However, both Can˜ares (2011) and Bullough et al. (2014) show that these slowdowns
are accompanied by strong resilience, resulting in no difference in the number of small
firms or self employed. This is confirmed by an analysis of a large cross section of Afghan
households finding that conflict intensity7 is only weakly negatively correlated with the
household’s choice to run a small business (Ciarli et al., 2010). Indeed, firms can gain
from violent conflict (civil war) in resource intense industries, as it has been the case for
Angola firms engaged in diamond extraction (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2007). A number
of studies go further and find that exposure to violence even increases entrepreneurial
activity (Branzei and Abdelnour, 2010). For example, using micro data on self employment
in Colombia, Bozzoli et al. (2013) find that between 2002 and 2006 the displacement due
to violence has a positive effect on self employment in services, but with reduced income.
Other microeconomic studies that find an increased PEA are Abdelnour et al. (2008) for
7Measured with 13 indicators of subjective and objective conflict intensity from different sources.
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women in Sudan and Anugwom (2011) for women in Nigeria. Conflict may also influence
PEA by affecting social capital. For example, Gilligan et al. (2011) and Voors et al. (2012)
find that the violent conflict has promoted pro-social behaviour, respectively in Nepal and
in Burundi, which can be conducive to entrepreneurship.
2.2 Casual and Formal Entrepreneurship
At the core of these different findings may be that entrepreneurship is highly heteroge-
neous. In the recent literature on entrepreneurship in low income countries major distinc-
tions are made. For instance, Reynolds et al. (2001) distinguish between necessity and
opportunity entrepreneurship, where the first one is mainly a substitute for the lack of
employment and yields low value added. In practice, it is difficult to distinguish between
households that invest in an entrepreneurial activity only because of necessity from those
that invest only because they see a business opportunity (Can˜ares, 2011). However, this
literature seems to agree that entrepreneurship in low income countries leans toward the
necessity type (Acs et al., 2004; Acs and Szerb, 2009), particularly in areas with violent
conflict (Naude´, 2007).
Similarly, Lerner and Schoar, eds (2010) distinguish between subsistence and trans-
formational entrepreneurs. Assuming that we can distinguish between two ideal types of
entrepreneurs, which for simplicity we refer to as casual (self-employed, for subsistence and
necessity) and formal (opportunity seekers and transformational), the literature suggests
that casual self-employment is a substitute for labour: unemployed become self-employed
to earn a leaving. As soon as labour opportunities emerge again, some of these will be
better than self-employment, and some self-employed will leave their activity and return
to paid job (Lucas, 1978).
The evidence collected in Lerner and Schoar, eds (2010) shows that subsistence en-
trepreneurs tend to move between the labour market and self employment, and rarely they
manage to make the step towards transformational entrepreneurs. Mondrago´n-Ve´lez and
Pen˜a (2010) also suggest that casual entrepreneurs have a lower human capital than formal
ones. A large study over 74 developing countries (Gindling and Newhouse, 2014) suggests
that we can usually observe a transition from casual self employment in agriculture, to
casual self employment out of agriculture to paid work.
2.3 The Choice of Private Economic Activity Under Conflict in Afghanistan
If, as suggested by some of the evidence, PEA does not fall back, or even grows, in
areas plagued by violent conflict, what kind of PEA is likely to develop? We look at
the available evidence for Afghanistan. Iyer and Santos (2012) show that despite the
shortfalls in the private sector demand for labour in conflict areas, in Afghanistan, India,
Nepal, and Sri Lanka there is more employment in conflict areas than in non-conflict areas.
They note that the forms of employment that raise in these conflict areas are: (i) women
workers replacing absent men, particularly in the agricultural sector;8 (ii) agricultural
employment; (iii) and unpaid family labour. In sum, in the South Asian countries that have
experienced, or are experiencing violent conflict, conflict areas may have a higher rate of
self-employment, but these are lower quality activities, involving people with significantly
lower education attainment than in non-conflict areas. This is mainly because in conflict
areas wages are significantly lower, due to an increase in the supply of labour and a
8The “added worker” effect found in a number of empirical analysis of conflict (e.g. Justino et al., 2012;
Menon and Rodgers, 2013; Shemyakina, 2011).
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reduction in demand, associated with the closure of most productive businesses (Iyer and
Santos, 2012).
This is in line with Berman et al. (2011) findings that in Iraq, Afghanistan and The
Philippines unemployment is negatively related to insurgent activities, with the finding
that Afghan individuals that are exposed to violence tend to have a higher preference
for certainty (Callen et al., 2014) – which may reduce the number of household holding
a business, and that the perception of danger in Afghanistan reduces the disposition to
entrepreneurial activity, except for resilient individuals (Bullough et al., 2014).
2.4 Doing Business in Afghanistan
Despite the high growth rates in the last decade, Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries
in the world. The average income per capita in 2008 (the last year of our study) was about
325 US dollars per year, and social indicators are also at the bottom of the world ranks.
Agriculture is the main source of household income and the size of the informal sector
is large (Ward et al., 2008). Ward et al. (2008) describes the Afghan economy as an
“informal equilibrium not conducive to growth” where informal sector enterprises are too
small, disparate and not organized to meet the needs of the market.
Conflict has persisted in Afghanistan since the early 1980s changing parties and inten-
sity over time and the high level of insecurity represents a major impediment to develop-
ment (Ward et al., 2008).
The World Bank firm survey in 2008 (IFC, 2014) shows that, although firms experi-
enced growth in sales, their participation to the export market was extremely low with
respect to other low income countries. Firms experienced barriers to business with respect
to (i) the high cost of dealing with the government, (ii) the large number of bribes paid,
and (iii) access to finance. But the main obstacles to doing business were (i) crime, theft
and disorder, (ii) electricity, and (iii) political instability. That is, the violent conflict
and its consequence on infrastructures. The situation was even gloomier in high con-
flict areas, where firms were even more constrained from doing business with respect to
infrastructures, the regulatory framework, security, and skills (Iyer and Santos, 2012)
3 Data and Identification Strategy
3.1 Building the Database
The analysis below is based on three main sources of data. First, a unique dataset har-
monising three different waves of a large household survey run in Afghanistan in 2003,
2005, 2007/8 – National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA), and the Afghan ad-
ministrative borders, which changed during the years of the last conflict. For a number
of limitations discussed in the Web Appendix (Sections 1.1 and 1.2),9 in this paper our
analysis uses the data from 2005 to 2008. We include 2003 as a robustness check. In
Section 1.1 of the Web Appendix we provide an overview of NRVA for the different years,
and in Section 1.2 of the Web Appendix we discuss the procedures used to harmonise the
household data.
The second and third datasets consist of all the geocoded conflict actions, either
recorded by the US military – Afghan War Diaries (AWD) – or which appeared in the me-
dia – Global Dataset on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT). The details of the conflict
data can be found in Section 2 of the Web Appendix.
9https://users.sussex.ac.uk/~hbp48/projects/pedl/AfghPooledShort_Jan15RevApp.html
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Based on the first data source we built a number of different definitions of PEA, and
based on the second and third data sources we built a number of different definitions of
conflict.
3.1.1 Identification of Different PEA
There is no one single definition of private economic activity (PEA) – or of entrepreneur-
ship.10 Exploiting the richness of the NRVA questionnaire we construct different definitions
of PEA, disentangling the main sources of income of a household in to mutually exclusive
types of activities.
The first type of PEA that we define is that of households indicating as its main source
of income a small business (bus).
The second type of PEA consists of a group of activities that are usually considered
self employment, and which are outside the agricultural sector, such as carpet weaving and
taxi driving (se na) – see Table 8 and the Web Appendix for a full list of activities. Among
self employment we further distinguish between lower capital intensive PEA (Low K) and
higher capital intensive PEA (High K).
The third type of PEA, is self employment in the agricultural sector (agric) – see Table
8 for a full list of activities. We further distinguish between PEA in subsistence agriculture
(agr sub), and PEA related to the sale of agricultural products (not for consumption)
(agr sale).
The residual category is composed by all (main) sources of household income that do
not consist in an entrepreneurial activity, such as paid labour, opium, or other sources of
rent.
For our main period of analysis (2005-2008) we define a household (HH) of a given
PEA type when the main source of income is generated by that type of PEA. The reason
for focussing on the most important source of income is to have a database of mutually
exclusive occupational options, where each household is identified with only one type
of PEA. Among the robustness tests we check if results differ when considering as well
secondary sources of income to identify the PEA of a HH.11
Tables 1 shows how PEA is distributed in our sample for all the years of the survey, and
we show the correlation among the different definitions in Table 12 in the Appendix. The
highest share of households earn their main income from self employment, and in particular
from subsistence agriculture. Around 70% of the HH who’s main source of income is in
agriculture cultivate mainly for direct consumption. Only between ten and sixteen percent
of the households earn their main source of income from self employment unrelated to
agriculture. This percentage increases significantly from 2003 to 2007/8. Among the
self employed, approximately two thirds own an activity that requires a small capital
investment, and the rest have invested in an activity with a higher capital need. Only a
very small portion of Afghan households are what we referred to as formal entrepreneurs,
earning their main income from a small business.
We next move to the construction of conflict indicators.
10See discussion in Section 2.
11In 2003 the type of HH is identified with the number of HH members working in a small business or
self-employment. In Section 1.2 of the Web Appendix we describe in detail how the different PEA variables
were harmonised across the different survey waves.
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Variable Definition 2003 2005 2007/8
1 bus small business 2.02 5.05 2.03
2 se na non agricultural self employment 10.48 10.85 16.39
3 Low K lower capital intensive activities N.A. 6.43 11.24
4 High K higher capital intensive activities N.A. 4.42 5.15
5 agric agricultural self employment 32.81 39.53 29.15
6 agr sub subsistence agriculture N.A. 29.06 19.78
7 agr sale agriculture for sale N.A. 10.47 9.37
3 + 4 (= 2) 10.85 16.39
6 + 7 (= 5) 39.53 29.16
Table 1: Percentage of PEA for different years of hte survey
Source: own computation based on NRVA 2003-08
3.1.2 Conflict Measures
The effect of conflict on economic behaviour changes for distinct conflict features. For
instance, one area may be affected by a handful of devastating events, which cause a high
number of casualties; or it can be affected by many violent events that overall cause a small
number of casualties. The same number of events, in one area may be highly concentrated
in a small number of days, in another area they may be uniformly distributed along time.
These differences are more than statistical artefacts: they do represent quite different
conflicts. In the attempt to capture these different aspects of a violent conflict, we define
a number of different indicators using the available data: the count of conflict events, their
impact on the population in terms of casualties, and their frequency.
The first conflict indicator that we use reflects the overall intensity of the conflict: we
count the number of relevant conflict events in a given area recorded by the US army in
the Afghan war diaries (AWD),12 which can be disruptive for private economic activity
(n conflict). In the Web Appendix (Section 2.1, Table 5) we list the type of events that
were considered as relevant. n conflict captures whether an area has experienced strong
conflict, independently from its impact in terms of victims and its frequency in terms of
interval between two subsequent conflict events. In addition, as a control, we employ the
number of material conflicts recorded in the media (n event4). The variable is built using
data from the Global Dataset on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT),13 which collects
information from a very long time series. The information is not as precise as the one
recorded in the AWD, but allows to account for conflict events from the 70’s to date.
The second indicator captures the impact of the conflict on individuals. We compute
the total number of people wounded and killed in a given area, as recorded by the US army
in the AWD (n wk). We further differentiate among those who mainly suffer the impact in
to three distinct populations, using the classifications in the data: US military (n wk usa),
those considered ‘insurgents’ (n wk ins), and civilians (n wk civ). For instance, it may
be that fights between US troops and the Taliban are more likely to occur in less densely
populated areas, whereas civilians are more likely to suffer the consequences of the conflict
in areas where there is more economic activity. Moreover, we expect civilians’ economic
activities to be influenced more by the loss of civilians than by the loss of combatants.
The third indicator captures the time frequency of the conflict events. We count
12Data and sources described in Section 2.1 of the Web Appendix.
13Section 2.2 of the Web Appendix
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the number of days with no recorded conflicts, and compute the ratio with respect to
the calendar year (peace days). Differently from the previous variables, here we do not
consider the intensity of the conflict – multiple conflict events occurring in a single day
are not considered. What we mainly want to capture with the peace days variable is
the expectations that households may form on the occurrence of future violent conflicts
(Callen et al., 2014).14 Based on GDELT we also compute a variable cum conf containing
the cumulated number of material events since the beginning of the last conflict in 2001.
The fourth indicator captures the household perception of the violent conflict, which
may differ from the violence recorded by the troops and the media. We count the number
of households that have responded that they have suffered from a shock due to insecurity
or violence in the previous year, and we compute the ratio of affected households per area
(p shockins).
All conflict indicators are likely to suffer from some limitations. We will not discuss
here these limitations, confident that the use of different indicators, from different reliable
and precise sources, leads to robust results. In Table 2 we summarise the definition, source,
and time coverage of the different indicators. In Table 13 in the Appendix we also show
how they are correlated.
Variable Description Sourcea Years
1 n conflict N. of conflict events AWD 2004-9
2 n wk N. of wounded and killed AWD 2004-9
3 n wk civ N. of wounded and killed civilians AWD 2004-9
4 n wk usa N. of wounded and killed u.s.a. soldiers AWD 2004-9
5 n wk ins N. of wounded and killed insurgent AWD 2004-9
6 peace days % of days with no conflict per year AWD 2004-9
7 p shockins % of HH affected by insecurity shocks NRVA 2003-8
8 n event4 N. of material conflict events GDELT 1979-14
9 n noconflict N. of “no-conflict” military events AWD 2004-9
10 cum conf N. of material conflict events cumulated since
2001
GDELT 2001-6
aSee the Web Appendix for a detailed explanation of the sources.
Table 2: Summary of conflict variables. All variables are computed for a given area.
Source: own computation based on AWD, GDELT and NRVA
In the Figures 1 to 6 we map the geographical distribution of the conflict for the mea-
sures defined above, for different years. We compare these figures with different sources,
and find a remarkable similarity (Section 2.4 of the Web Appendix).
All data seem to agree that through the years the conflict has dramatically intensified
in the South, along the border with Pakistan, where it has focussed since the beginning,
and it has also spread north-east and north-west, covering an Afghan internal ellipse not
far from its borders. In other words, between 2005 and 2008 the country has experienced
a significant time and space variation of the conflict. It is this these variations that we aim
to exploit to analyse the effect that the increased conflict has on entrepreneurial activity.
14We have computed a number of different variables to record the frequency, such as the maximum, the
minimum, the average, and the median number of days between two subsequent events. In this paper we
show results using the sum, as they are the most precise estimator for peace frequency.
9
3.2 Empirical Strategy
Our baseline empirical model tests the probability that a household is engaged in one type
of PEA:
Pr (PEA)itpj = β1 ∗ Conflicttpk + β2 ∗ Conflictt−1pk + Controlsit + τt + pip + itp (1)
where Pr(PEA) is the probability for an household i at time t located in some area p to
engage in a PEA of type j;15 Conflict is one of the k measures of conflict in the area p at
time t;16 Controls include a set of household-specific control variables; τ and pi are time
and area fixed effect, respectively; and  is a household specific error term. The unit of
observation is the household, and standard errors are clustered at area level. The initial
sample contains 11,760 households in 2003, 30,826 in 2005, and 20,668 in 2007/8. After
removing the nomadic population (Kuchi), to reduce the problem of spatial sorting, and
data cleaning, we observe 11,639 households in 2003, 29,087 in 2005 and 19,432 in 2007/8.
The equation is estimated with a Linear Probability Model (LPM). Although the
dependent variable is a probability bounded within zero and one, the linear specification
is preferred to the Probit model because of the large number of fixed effects; results from
Probit estimations, available from the authors, show no significant differences.
3.2.1 Definition of the Spatial Unit of Analysis
The choice of the proper spatial unit of analysis is a crucial issue in analyses at a very
detailed spatial scale like the one in this paper. First, the ‘area’ p is the spatial unit
within which the conflict events that may be relevant to the households’ occupational
choice occur. The smaller is the spatial unit, the closer are the events to the household, on
average. Second, we define a set of fixed effects at the area level. The definition of the area
influences the precision with which we control for all time-invariant geographical factors –
such as ruggedness, climate, distance to the Pakistan border and to major cities, and, in
first approximation, for ‘structural’ factors that change very slowly over time and for which
time-variant data are non available – including population density, other demographic
factors (average age, ethnic composition, etc.), irrigation, and mineral resources.
The definition of the spatial unit may therefore significantly affect the results. In the
literature on spatial/urban economics, regional science, and quantitative geography, the
issues associated with the choice of the appropriate spatial unit of reference falls under
the heading of the ‘modifiable areal unit problem’ (MAUP). Differently from international
comparisons, where country borders are attached with socio-economic and political mean-
ings, at a sub-national level there usually are many alternative options among spatial
units of different shape and size. It has been shown that economic estimates may present
huge variations across different spatial classifications (Arbia, 1989; Gehlke and Biehl, 1934;
Menon, 2012; Openshaw, 1983). In some circumstances, a viable solution is using spatial
units that approximately match the spatial extent of the economic phenomenon under
scrutiny – e.g., commuting-defined local labour market areas for analysis of local unem-
ployment. This however requires access to a well-established local statistics infrastructure,
which is not generally available for low-income countries. The only sub-national geograph-
ical classifications available for Afghanistan are provinces and districts, which borders have
little meaning for private economic activity, and even less for conflict. Moreover, their size
heterogeneity may significantly jeopardize the results: by using the district as the spatial
15PEA equals one if the HH is an entrepreneurial HH and 0 otherwise. The definitions of the j different
types of PEA is given in Section 3.1.1.
16The definitions of the k different measures of conflict is given in Section 3.1.2.
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unit, we would implicitly attribute the same value to a conflict happening at the other
end of the district – possibly hundreds of kilometres away from the household – and to a
conflict taking place in the same village where the household is located. Furthermore, the
location of households and conflict events can also be endogenous to the district borders,
e.g. in the case in which the border is drawn along a mountain watershed – which Taliban
use as refugees – or a village is located at the centre of the district.
One possible solution is to weight conflict events with their distance to the village,
but our initial tests showed that this strategy still leads to imprecise results, because the
effect of distance is likely to be highly non-linear, and there are many unobserved spatial
discontinuities due to physical geography (rivers, mountains, etc.) that cannot be taken
into account.
We therefore adopted an alternative solution, i.e., we created an ad-hoc regular ge-
ography for Afghanistan. More specifically, we superimposed on the Afghan territory a
regular grid of squared cells of 0.3 degree width (corresponding to approximately 33 km).
All households and conflict events are then assigned to the cell in which they are physically
located, given the geographical coordinates. The cell is then the ‘area’ in equation 1. We
chose the size of the cell with the following trade-off in mind: first, the cell should be large
enough to ‘minimize’ the number of cells populated by households only in one of the years,
as those would be dropped from the fixed-effect estimation, given that they do not show
any variation over time. On the other hand, the cell should be small enough to ‘maximise’
precision of the estimation of the fixed effect and to match the spatial decay of the impact
of conflict events on the households’ choices.17 After experimenting size and number of
households for a number of different degrees, 0.3 is the smaller size we could use without
critically reducing the size of the sample – 75% of the cells are non-empty in both years
(third column in Table 3).18
This approach brings a number of advantages for the empirical analysis. First, the
number of spatial units is larger than the number of districts (Table 3), increasing the
precision of the spatial fixed effects and the sample size; second, we get rid of the hetero-
geneity in the most important spatial dimension, i.e., the area; third – and as a corollary of
the size homogeneity – conflict events are on average located at the same distance from the
households, being their distance from the cell border defined randomly. This randomness,
in turn, implies that we do not need to rely on a parametric distance weighting of conflict
events.
In Table 3 we compare the number of household sampled in the ‘area’ for different
definitions of the spatial unit: our preferred sized cell (0.3 degrees), the district, and a cell
of size similar to the average district (0.4 degrees). As the number of areas is significantly
larger when we use a cell of 0.3 degrees width, the number of households in each area is
smaller, on average. Adopting cells of 0.3 degrees width in our analysis we have to comply
with an attrition rate of 25%, against almost no attrition in the case of districts – and
17% for cells of 0.4 degrees width.
In Section 4.4, among the robustness tests, we replicate the main results for larger cells
(0.4 degree) and the original districts.
17Yonamine (2013) shows that fine graining significantly improves the prediction of conflict events.
18Starting from the minimum x and y spatial coordinates for Afghanistan as lower bounds, and by the
same values added by 0.3 degrees as upper bounds, the grid is created by incrementally adding 0.3 degree
to either the latitudinal or the longitudinal dimension of the lower and upper bounds, and by tagging all
the households and conflict events that fall into the x− y interval. The process ends when the maximum
x and y are beyond the Afghanistan border, and each household and event has a cell identifier.
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Cell width=0.3 Cell width=0.4 Districts
2005 2007/8 2005-08 2005 2007/8 2005-08 2005 2007/8
Non empty areas 467 478 354 316 327 268 383 389
Mean 62.28 40.65 60.47 92.04 59.43 85.89 76 50
Median 35 24 32 48 32 48 48 32
p10 12 8 8 12 8 12 24 16
p90 130 80 130 188 136 188 141 88
Table 3: Spatial features for different definitions of the area: number of areas with
at least one household, mean and median number of households per area, and min (first
decile) and max (last decile) number of households
Source: own computation based on NRVA
3.2.2 Causality and Identification
Although the LPM does not generally allow for a causal interpretation of the estimated
coefficients – due to potential sources of reverse causality and omitted variable bias –
we built our empirical strategy in order to minimise potential sources of bias. First, the
richness of the information collected by the NRVA survey allows to include a wide set
of control variables, which minimize the risk that unobserved heterogeneity correlated
with the conflict indicators biases its coefficient. Some of these controls are introduced as
robustness checks (see section 4.4).
Second, we include a wide set of fixed effects defined at a narrow spatial scale, which
absorb the effect of all time-invariant local unobservable factors (e.g. ruggedness, natural
resources, agro-environmental characteristics, etc). Importantly, fixed effects at the level
of the small spatial unit defined above is a robust control for the distance between the
household and the closest border with Pakistan, a source of trade and therefore of PEA.
Third, recent empirical evidence using the same source of conflict data accurately
shows that the spatial diffusion of the conflict in Afghanistan over time (starting in 2004)
can be modelled with good precision using a latent Gaussian model based only on the
information on previous conflict events (Zammit-Mangion et al., 2013, 2012). The control
for topological features, such as ruggedness, and distance to the Pakistan border, does
not add much information. Similarly, Yonamine (2013) also finds quite regular patterns of
mean reverting conflict dynamics using a more standard auto regressive moving average
model (ARFIMA). He also finds that variables that are potentially endogenous in the
relation between conflict events and household behaviour, such as opium prices, do not
improve the accuracy of predictions. As Zammit-Mangion et al. (2012, p.6) argue: “the
Afghan conflict is characterized by insurgent movements and qualifies as a case of irregular
warfare where activity is only loosely dependent and actioned by a myriad of disparate
groups. Some averaging effects may be leading to the Gaussian behaviour of the conflict’s
intensity, which in turn may be exploited for modelling purposes” (Zammit-Mangion et
al., 2012, p.6). This comes very handy in our setting, as it makes unlikely the possibility
of dynamic endogeneity of the conflict variable with respect to household occupational
choice.
Moreover, the Afghan conflict is led by foreign troops (NATO), who are unlikely to
be concerned with the local economic private activities such as small businesses and self
employment.19
19The ISAF troops have no mandate to contrast the production of opium (Lind et al., 2014).
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Our main strategy to improve the identification of the relation between conflict and
household entrepreneurial activity is to use different indicators of conflict – which in-
clude the intensity, the parties involved (civilians, US troops and local armies), household
perception of violence and the frequency – and different types of entrepreneurship. For
instance, households with rich entrepreneurial activities might attract violent conflict, but
it is unlikely that this is reflected also in a high frequency of attacks (once their wealth has
reduced as a consequence of the attack), unless the interviewed households live in a com-
pound of businesses protected by national military, which is not the case. And even when
this is the case, the distinction between different forms of entrepreneurship should identify
the effect on formal businesses differently from casual and/or rural self employment.
Moreover, although the ISAF military intervention are not related to opium, to be
on the safest side we distinguish household cultivating opium as their main activity from
households that have different forms of PEA. Households who’s main source of income is
opium cultivation or labour are not included in any for of PEA. As a robustness check
(see below) we also control for the local percentage of opium cultivation.
However, there might still be sources of bias due to omitted variables or reverse causal-
ity mechanisms we are not aware of. Therefore, among our robustness checks we control
for a number of proxies of potential omitted variables, and we instrument the current
conflict via two-stages least squares (2SLS) estimations.
3.2.3 Control Variables
On top of the intensity, impact, and frequency of the conflict – described in Section 3.1.2 –
we control for a large number of potential determinants of a household engagement with a
PEA. We include traditional determinants of entrepreneurial activity widely studied in the
literature (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989, e.g.), such as household
features and access to markets (credit, inputs and outputs), geographical features such as
infrastructures, institutions, and shocks other than conflict. To proxy for the size of the
local market we also distinguish between urban and rural areas.20 To further control for
issues related to spatial sorting, we include in the regression the information about the
members of the households that migrated in the previous year.
We list and describe all the control variables included in the main regressions in Table
9 in the Appendix. In Tables 10 and 11 we also detail the main descriptive statistics of
the variables included in the main pooled sample 2005-2007/8, and in the the 2003-2007/8
control sample, respectively.
In tables 12, 13, and 14 in the Appendix we show the correlations among PEA variables,
conflict variables and all control variables. There is no sign of high correlation which could
lead to multicollinearity, if not for the dummies for mutually exclusive categories.
4 Results
Given the aim of this paper to identify as precisely as possible different effects of conflict
on the household’s decision to invest in different types of PEA, we need to summarise a
large set of results combining several conflict indicators and several definitions of PEA.
In the first section (4.1) we present the results on the effect of the main conflict indicator
k on each type of PEA j. All estimations result from regressions including all control
variables (Table 9), year and area fixed effects. For each type of PEAj , the first column
20The sampling of households is not representative at the level of the spatial unit constructed by us.
Estimations of the population size at this level are therefore not reliable.
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includes the effect of the current level of conflict, and the second column includes both
the current and the lagged value of the conflict in the household area.
In the second section 4.2 we focus on the role of self employment in the agricultural
sector in driving the results of the effect of conflict on PEA. We estimate the effect of
conflict on agricultural assets. A negative effect would indicate that farmers tend to sell
livestock to cope with the conflict shocks, attempts to reducing the risk of being targeted,
or migrate. A positive effect would confirm that conflict induces households to invest
in agricultural activities in order to cope with the lack of labour and with high political
and economic uncertainty. The literature has found mixed results (e.g. Bundervoet, 2010;
Gonzalez and Lopez, 2007; Verpoorten, 2009).
Third, despite the stochastic nature of the Afghan conflict (Zammit-Mangion et al.,
2013, 2012), there may still be reasons to think that some forms of PEA may attract more
or less conflict. For example, local insurgents may use local, non-opium related, economic
resources to finance the conflict, while protecting entrepreneurial activity. In other words,
households may be better able to undergo entrepreneurial activity where the insurgents
are located, because they may feel they run lower risks. The presence of insurgents, in
turn, may attract more conflict. As a further check we instrument the intensity of the
current conflict led by ISAF with past levels of conflict during the Soviet war in they same
cell. Results are presented in Section 4.3.
Finally, in the last section (4.4) we discuss the results checking for a large number of
potential sources of bias. First, we check whether the effect of conflict runs mainly through
the destruction of infrastructures. We interact the intensity of conflict with the distance
form markets and roads.
Second, we use a different definition of PEA: instead of using the main source of income,
we define an entrepreneurial household when a PEA contributes to the household income
at any level.
Third, PEA may be influenced by the presence of military bases and aid programmes,
which influence the labour market, and may also provide new incentives for PEA. We
check for this effect by using the number of non relevant conflict events, i.e. events that
show the presence of US military, but that are not direct source of violence. For example
air movement, checkpoints, and false and suspect improvised explosion devices (IED). In
doing so we assume that NGO and other aid programmes are more likely to be located
closer to areas which are also “protected” by the presence of military troops.
Fourth, although we control for the lagged level of conflict, the decision on whether
to invest in a PEA may depend on history of the last conflict, rather than simply on the
current or last year level of conflict. That is, similar to the when we use a yearly frequency
variable, we test if the main results change when we consider the cumulation of conflict
events since 2001 up to the year preceding the household interview.
Finally, we check whether the results are robust to a number of variations in the
control variables and in the sample: we control for the (i) inclusion of the 2003 households
in the sample, (ii) different functional forms of the conflict measures, (iii) the rate of local
unemployment, (iv) the intensity of opium cultivation, (v) the separation of urban and
rural samples, (vi) the size of the area, (vii) excluding the households surveyed in 2007,
and (viii) clustering the standard errors at the district level.
4.1 Conflict on PEA
Table 4 summarises the result of our main measure of conflict objective intensity (n conflict)
and time frequency (peace days) on the different types of PEA (listed in the second row):
small business (bus), self employment in non-agricultural activities (se na), divided into
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lower capital intensity (Low K) and higher capital intensity (High K), and agricultural
activity (agric) divided into subsistence agriculture (agr sub) and agriculture for sale
(agr sale).
All regressions are linear (LPM),21 they include control variable (Section 3.2.3 and
Table 9), year and area fixed effects. In the odd columns we estimate the effect of the
current measure of conflict; in the even columns we estimated the effect of the current and
the past measure of conflict (indicated by the name of the variable preceded by l1 ).
The regression analysis shows that the intensity of conflict has a general positive effect
on entrepreneurial activity. This may be because of the decision of households residing
in the area, or because new households have moved in the area. Although we believe
that the second explanation is not so common in the case of Afghanistan, in this paper
we are not interested in discriminating between the two explanations. The number of
conflict events – both in the same year and in the year before the NRVA survey – show
a significant association with the probability of owning a small business (cols. 1-2). The
magnitude of the coefficient implies that an increase of 100 relevant conflict events, i.e. of
approximately two standard deviations (sd) in n conflict, is associated with an increase of
the probability that a household in the same cell owns a small business of approximately
0.03-0.05 % points (pp), i.e., on average of around 0.011-0.2%. Considering that the
average number of conflict events per cell in the sample is around 13, the magnitude of
the effect is relatively small, but not totally negligible given the small share of business
owners, and would probably be hard to detect with a less precise estimation setting.
The effect on non-agricultural self employment (cols. 3-4), instead, is not significant.
However, the decomposition of non-agricultural self employment activities into lower- and
higher-capital intensive (respectively cols. 5-6 and 7-8) reveals that the non significant
coefficient is due to the two contrasting effects on activities with different capital in-
tensity. Indeed, conflict intensity is negatively associated with higher capital intensive
self-employment, and it is positively associated with self-employment activities based on
small capital investments. The magnitude of the effects are also quite small. An increase
of 100 conflicts (∼ 2sd) per cell-year increases the probability that a household earns its
income mainly from a lower capital intensive self employment activity by .04-.07 pp, and
decreases the probability that a household earns its income mainly from a lower capital
intensive self employment activity by 0.3-0.4 pp.
The results on agricultural activities (cols. 9-10) further suggest that the positive as-
sociation of conflict with self-employment is almost entirely attributable to activities with
lower value added related to subsistence agriculture, rather than to the commercialisation
of agricultural goods. The estimated coefficient for the overall effect on agricultural ac-
tivities is relatively large, implying that, on average, 100 conflict more in a cell, per year,
are associated with an increase in the probability that a households gains its wage mainly
from agriculture of approximately 1.2-1.5 pp. Instead, an increase of 100 conflict events
in t − 1 increases the probability in t of about 0.8 pp, which is entirely explained by self
subsistence agriculture (cols. 11-12), and not by sale of agricultural goods (cols. 13-14),
of potentially higher value added.
When we turn to the frequency of the conflict in terms of the total number of days
with no conflict activities in a year, the results are very similar, but less significant. More
peace days reduce the likelihood that a household owns a small business (cols. 1-2), as
well as the investment in lower capital self employment activities (cols. 5-6). The increase
in higher capital activities (cols. 7-8) is barely significant and the decrease in lower capital























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































activities is observed only with a one period lag. That is, halving the ratio of peace days
in year t (a decrease of 97 % points) increases the probability that a household holds a
lower capital self employment activity by about 5 pp in year t + 1. Whereas frequency
has no significant effect on agriculture (cols. 9-14). These results suggest that households
react to the number of conflict events, and their time frequency in a very similar way, but
the overall intensity in a year is more relevant than whether the events are clustered in a
few days or evenly distributed across the year.
In the Appendix we present further results on the other measures of conflict analysed
(Table 15): impact (n wk, n wk usa, n wk ins, n wk civ), household subjective experi-
ence (p shockins), and an alternative measure of intensity (n event4). The overall picture
is very similar, but with some interesting differences worth discussing. First, the most pre-
cise indicators of conflict to measure the effect on PEA are the total number of relevant
conflict, discussed above, and the total number of people wounded and killed (n wk).
Second, we distinguish among different populations of wounded and killed. The number
of wounded and killed USA or Taliban soldiers does not have any significant effect on PEA.
Instead, it is the number of civilians that drives the entire effect of the impact of conflict on
PEA. For instance, for an increase of 20 (∼ 1sd) civilians wounded or killed in a cell-year
we estimated an increase in the likelihood of households owning a small business (cols.
1-2) of about 0.17 pp a reduction in the likelihood of households’ self employment in higher
capital-intensive activities (cols. 7-8) of about 0.2-0.27 pp, an increase in the likelihood of
households’ lower capital-intensive activities (cols 5-6) of almost 0.29 pp and an increase
in in the likelihood of households’ agricultural activities (cols. 9-10) of about 0.4-0.54 pp,
all concentrated in subsistence agriculture (cols. 11-12). We do not find significant lagged
effect when considering impact of conflict through people lives.
Third, the percentage of households that have experienced a shock due to insecurity
or violence in the previous year reproduces some of the main effects discussed above,
but is not very significant. For instance, there is no effect on the likelihood of owning a
small business. Instead, the results suggest that the most affected households move their
income sources towards agricultural self employment, producing goods that can be sold in
the market.
Finally, the number of events registered by the media (in the GDELT database) is a
less good proxy of conflict intensity than the more precise self reported data in the Afghan
war diaries.
Overall, the results indicate that, although there is a small positive effect of the inten-
sity and frequency of conflict and its impact on civil casualties on the probability that a
households owns a small business or becomes self-employed, the overall effect on private
economic activity is negative. The conflict intensity, impact, perception, and frequency
push households towards activities with lower investment and value added – or zero value
added, in the case of self subsistence agriculture. Households substitute labour income
with self employment that is not likely to have a large impact on welfare.
4.2 Conflict on Productive Agricultural Assets
To further disentangle the effect of conflict on self employment, we focus on agriculture,
for which we have a richer account of productive assets. We estimate the effect of conflict
intensity on the number/size of the agricultural assets owned by the household using
the following equation (irrespective on whether the main activity of the household is
agricultural or not):
Assetsitpj = β1 ∗ Conflicttpk + β2 ∗ Conflictt−1pk + Controlsit + τt + pip + itp (2)
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where Assetsitpj is the number of assets of class j owned by household i located in some
area p in year t; and all the rest is defined as in equation 1. We consider the following three
classes of agricultural assets j: number of livestock (camels, oxen, cattle, horses, sheep,
goats, and donkeys), number of capital goods (tractor and thresher), and land ownership.
The equation is estimated with a linear model.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES n agrica1 n agrica1 n agrica2 n agrica2 n agrica3 n agrica3
n conflict 2.056* 1.486 -0.114* -0.085 0.040 0.002
(1.078) (0.991) (0.061) (0.056) (0.081) (0.076)
l1 n conflict 1.213 -0.061*** 0.081***
(0.740) (0.019) (0.030)
R-squared 0.185 0.185 0.826 0.826 0.308 0.308
peace days -1.674 -1.352 0.075 0.039 -0.087 -0.027
(1.330) (1.156) (0.074) (0.068) (0.080) (0.081)
l1 peace days -0.544 0.062** -0.102***
(1.076) (0.025) (0.038)
R-squared 0.185 0.185 0.826 0.826 0.308 0.309
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41,391 41,391 41,391 41,391 41,391 41,391
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the cell p.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are count (n agrica1 and n agrica2) and dummy (n agrica3) variables defined
at the household level specifying the number of agricultural asset of the household (livestock or capital)
and the ownership of land. The equation is estimated with a linear model (OLS). Conflict measures are
computed at the cell level (see Table 2 for definitions). All conflict measures, except for peace days and
p shockins, are divided by 1000. All equations are estimated with the control variables described in Tab.
9, year and cell fixed effects.
Table 5: OLS pooled cross-section estimates of conflict on the number of agri-
cultural assets (2005-2008)
Source: own computation based on NRVA and AWD
We present the results for the intensity and the frequency of conflict in Table 5. In
the first two columns (n agrica1) we estimated the effect of conflict on the number of
livestock owned (camels, oxen, cattle, horses, sheep, goats, and donkeys); in the following
two columns (n agrica2) we estimated the effect of conflict on the number of capital goods
owned (tractors and threshers); and in the last two columns we estimated the effect of
conflict on the size of the land owned (n agrica3).
The main results indicate a mixed behaviour, differing by type of asset. First, the
increase in the number of livestock (cols. 1-2) as a result of conflict intensity is large
but not significant once we remove the outliers. Only the impact of conflict in terms of
civilian casualties has a significant effect (Tab. 16): an increase of 20 civilian who are
wounded or killed in a cell-year (∼ 1sd) increases the number of livestock (including all
types of livestock) by 7.3 pp, that is, of about 0.5 animals, on average. Second, past
conflict intensity significant decreases the investment in capital goods (cols. 3-4) and
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significantly increases the probability that a HH owns a piece of land (cols. 5-6), but
with smaller magnitude: an increase of about 50 conflict events per cell-year reduces the
number of capital goods available to the households by about 0.3 pp (0.05% of a tractor
or thresher) and increases the probability of investing in land by about 0.4 pp. Third, the
current conflict intensity does not significantly affect the probability of investing in land
(positively) and in capital goods (negatively) (cols. 3-4).
The frequency of the conflict (peace days) events has a very similar effect. In Table 16
in the Appendix we consider all other indicators of conflict. The pattern is very similar to
the one discussed above for the effect on PEA: (i) the impact of conflict (n wk, n wk usa,
n wk ins, n wk civ) is significant mainly through the number of wounded and killed
civilians (n wk civ); (ii) the share of households experiencing violence (p shockins) is
barely significant, as well as the the number of events registered by the media (in the
GDELT database) (n event4).
The general result suggests that agricultural activities become more relevant under
intense conflict but households are likely to invest only in livestock and some land, while
they reduce the investment in capital goods.
Interestingly, when we focus on a sub-sample of the population including only the
households whose main source of income is related to an agricultural activity (agric), the
results are much less significant, for all conflict indicators, particularly with respect to live-
stock.22 Suggesting that for those households whose main source of income is agriculture,
the conflict (intensity, impact, frequency or experience) has no effect on the accumulation
of inputs needed to cultivate.
Overall, our results suggest that conflict induces more investment in agriculture, for the
least expensive inputs, due to a shift of households from non-agricultural to agricultural
activities.
4.3 An Instrument for Conflict: IV Description and 2SLS Estimations
As discussed earlier, the potential bias due to omitted variables, reverse causality and
measurement error is addressed controlling for a large number of different PEA activities
and conflict measures, and for household and district controls, cells fixed effects, and
lagged values of conflict. However, as an additional robustness test we build a time-variant
instrumental variable (IV) to be used in a two-stages least square (2SLS) estimation. In
this section we describe in details how the instrument is constructed and we discuss the
results of the 2SLS estimation.
The instrumental strategy is inspired by the so-called “shift-share” methodology used
in urban and regional economics to instrument regional economic growth, at least since
Bartik (1991) and Blanchard and Katz (1992). In both papers, the authors instrument
regional economic growth interacting the lagged regional sectoral structure with the con-
temporaneous national sectoral trend. A similar methodology has also been widely used
in the migration literature to instrument local migration flows. Here, researchers interact
the lagged ethnic enclaves with the contemporaneous nation-wide flows of ethnic groups
(Altonji and Card, 1991; Bartel, 1989; Saiz, 2007).
In our case, in order to instrument for conflict the instrumental variable has to be
strongly correlated with the cell-level variation over time in conflict intensity (relevance
condition) and, at the same time, it has to be properly excluded from the second stage re-
gression, i.e., it should affect PEA only through its effect on the conflict intensity variable,
not directly (exogeneity or exclusion condition).
22The results are not included here but are available form the authors.
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Following the “shift-share” approach, we interact the share of conflict per cell between
1979 and 1989 (the conflict during the Soviet occupation) over the total nation-wide num-
ber of conflict events in the same period (Share0p), with the contemporaneous nationwide
number of conflict events (Global Conft):
Share0p = Conf0p/Global Conf0 (3)
iv1tp = Share0p ∗Global Conft (4)
where Conf0p is the number of cell-level conflicts in time 0 in cell p, Global Conf
is the number of nationwide level conflicts in time 0 and time t, the index 0 refers to
the pre-sample period (1979-1989), and the index t represents the years of our analysis
t=[2005, 2007/8].
We choose the Soviet war rather than the Afghan civil war (1992-1996) or the anti-
Taliban resistance (1996-2001) because it took place long time ago (30 years before the
period of our analysis), it was a quite different conflict, with different targets, and fought for
different reasons, and the country went through many structural changes since then. This
implies that it is extremely unlikely that there is a common unobserved, cell-specific, time
trend between the outcome variables and the pattern of conflict, which could invalidate
the exclusion restrictions. We therefore assume that the significance of the instrument and
the subsequent first-stage correlation depend only on exogenous physical and geographical
factors (such as ruggedness, accessibility, position, etc) which makes a given cell more or
less likely to be affected by conflict events when the overall conflict intensity in the whole
country increases.
Second, the Soviets did not engage in reconstruction or development programs after
the war. This allows us to rule out the possibility that areas were the Russian war was
more intense benefited from programs that may have induced more economic activity.
Third, although the two conflicts were completely different, they both spread through-
out the whole country. In Figure 9 we plot the average number of relevant conflicts per
district over the periods of interest for the Soviet conflict (9a) and for the conflict studied
in this paper (data between 2004 and 2009) (9b). Due to differences in reporting be-
tween 30 years ago and recent years, the overall number of conflicts registered is clearly
different. However, the figure shows that both conflict where spread throughout the coun-
try, although the average intensity might differ between districts. The fact that the two
conflicts, on average, interested similar districts with similar intensity is confirmed by a
significant Spearman’s correlation coefficient of 0.41 between the number of events per
district in the two periods. Finally, Figure 9c plots the routes of the soviet invasion, which
is remarkably close to the belt of strongest conflict plot in Figure 9a.
Fourth, as suggested by Zammit-Mangion et al. (2012) the volatility of the conflict
within provinces is quite high, suggesting that it is difficult to identify trends. On the
contrary, the “irregular warfare” observed can be predicted, only because random effects
cancel out, showing Gaussian distribution of the conflict’s intensity.
The results from the first stage equation are reported in table 6. The instrumental
variable is positively correlated with the actual conflict intensity at cell level and the
estimates are extremely precise, also thanks to the large size of the household sample.
The IV is therefore very strong and the relevance condition is also respected.
The results from the second stage equation are presented in table 7: given the very
strong similarity with the baseline estimations, for brevity we report only the coefficients
for the main variable of conflict intensity (n conflict) – the results with the other conflict








Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in
parentheses, the cluster is the cell p.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: First stage of pooled IV regressions (2005-2008)
Source: own computation based on NRVA, AWD, and GDELT
All in all, the use of IV does not affect the discussion of the results of the baseline
regression (Section 4.1). Two differences are worth mentioning.
First, the effect of conflict on non-agricultural self-employment (se na, col. 2), which
is non statistically different from zero in the baseline regressions, turns significant in the
2SLS estimates. However, the 2SLS also confirms that the aggregate effect on se na is
the result of two opposing effects: positive on lower capital intensive activities (col. 3),
and negative on self employment activities requiring higher capital investments (col. 4).
In both the baseline and 2SLS regressions the absolute value of the coefficient is slightly
stronger for lower-capital activities, but only in the 2SLS regressions the difference is large
enough to turn significant the coefficient on the aggregate variable se na.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES bus se na Low K High K agric agr sub agr sale
n conflict 0.058*** 0.073** 0.136*** -0.063*** 0.196*** 0.192*** 0.004
(0.012) (0.029) (0.022) (0.013) (0.039) (0.039) (0.024)
R-squared 0.008 0.040 0.027 0.012 0.054 0.036 0.012
Cells F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36,140 36,140 36,140 36,140 36,140 36,140 36,140
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the cell p.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables defined at the household level specifying the type of
activity of the household (see Table 1 for definitions). Conflict measures are computed at the cell
level (see Table 2 for definitions). All equations are estimated with the control variables described
in Tab. 9, year and cell fixed effects.
Table 7: IV 2SLS pooled cross-section estimates of conflict on PEA (2005-
2008)
Source: own computation based on NRVA and GDELT
Second, the 2SLS coefficients are generally larger than those presented in the baseline
regressions for self employment – both with lower and higher capital intensity – and for
agriculture, in particular subsistence agriculture. The bias is downward for lower capital
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intensive self employment and particularly for subsistence agriculture, and positive for
higher capital intensive self employment. This may be due to omitted variables, as well
as to an “attenuation bias”. Concerning omitted variables, good candidates for omitted
variables are the households wealth (not well accounted for by the number of assets),
natural resources, and, with a less clear effect, in-migration. Higher household wealth is
positively correlated with higher capital intensive investments and possibly with conflict
targeting, but negatively correlated with subsistence agriculture. Similarly, a large pres-
ence of natural resources attracts both higher capital intensive investments, and conflict,
and is likely to reduce land for subsistence agriculture. Finally, migrants are more likely
to take up subsistence jobs, rather than investing in higher capital intensive activities;
and people will tend to migrate where there is less conflict. However, it is not clear if
areas characterised by less migration are more likely to host higher capital investors or
subsistence farmers. Other behavioural unobservables, which are appealing to relate to
both the source of income and to the level of conflict, such as risk preferences, are not
very promising candidate to explain the LPM bias. Indeed, risk aversion is negatively
correlated with capital investment and positively with the level of conflict.
However, the explanation of the “attenuation bias” of the 2SLS estimates can be
simply related to the independence of the measurement error of the cell-level conflict for
the endogenous variable and for the instrument. Given that the information on the conflict
level during the Russian conflict (used to construct the instrument) and the most recent
conflict level (instrumented) comes from two completely different datasets, it is likely
that the measurement error components potentially affecting both variables are mutually
independent. This is the necessary condition to make the 2SLS estimates consistent in
presence of well-behaved measurement errors.
However, it is worth noticing that the differences between the two sets of estimates –
LPM and 2SLS – are small and not always significant, which suggests that the measure-
ment error – as well as other sources of bias – does not affect the main conclusions of
the analysis. Overall, the instrumental variable estimations suggest that the LPM results
should be considered to be a conservative or lower-bound estimate of the true effect.
4.4 Robustness Checks
Although the main results were quite stable across a number of different specifications,
given the complexity of the data and of the subject we check for a number of potential
sources of bias and implement a number of robustness checks. Results are presented and
discussed below.
4.4.1 Destruction of Infrastructures: Interaction with Conflict
Given the high relevance that infrastructures have in the literature on conflict and de-
velopment, and their potentially strong effect in fostering/hindering economic activity of
any sort, we first analyse if the effect of conflict runs mainly through the destruction of
infrastructures. This is done by interacting the intensity of conflict with the distance from
markets and with the availability of roads.
We present results of the interaction with distance from markets in Table 17. The effect
of conflict is unchanged: the intensity (n conflict) is somehow less significant, but the
impact (n wk and n wk civ) is not. The main difference is in the effect of conflict intensity
on self employment in higher capital intensive activities (cols. 7-8): conflict intensity
(n conflict) has no significant effect, but its interaction with the distance from market
(IMkt) has a negative effect, meaning that the negative effect of conflict on activities with
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potentially higher value added occurs when the activities and the conflict are closer to the
market. Similarly, higher capital intensive activities increases with less frequent conflict
events (longer periods of peace) close to markets.
In Table 18 we show the estimated effects when we introduce the interaction between
the conflict indicators and the distance from the village to the main road. As for the
distance to market the results do not change much. Longer distance from the road clearly
reduces the probability that households invest in self employment activities with higher
capital intensity (cols 7-8), but the interaction is term (IRoad) is barely significant. The
only significant result that emerges is that conflict intensity has a positive effect on the
probability of engaging in activities related to the sales of agricultural product (cols. 13-
14) (rather than subsistence agriculture) when far from the main roads. Once more, this
indicates that conflict pushes activities that substitute for missing markets.
4.4.2 Broad Definition of PEA
In the main analysis we define an entrepreneurial household of a given type as a household
whose main source of income is a type of PEA. This is a more convenient definition because
most households have more than one source of income, and among those is often at least
one form of agriculture and/or self employment. In table 19 we report results for estimates
when PEAij = 1 if the PEA contributes to income even if it is not the main source of
income.
The main differences with respect to the baseline results are related to the fact that
most households hold some agricultural activity and/or some (low capital) self employment
activity, even when they contribute to the households income marginally.
First, self employment in non agriculture (cols. 3-4) now is negatively affected by
conflict (intensity and impact). This is simply due to the fact that many households have
at least a member with at least a low capital intensive self employment activity. E.g. it
is common to wave carpets in the household. However, only a small ratio of household
have a self employment activity with higher capital investment which is not the main
source of income. Therefore, the negative effect of conflict on higher capital intensive self
employment predominates (cols. 7-8) while the positive effect of lower capital intensive
self employment activities is not significant (cols. 5-6).
Second, conflict (intensity and impact) has no significant effect on the likelihood of
holding an agricultural activity (cols. 9-10): as discussed above, the large majority of
households are active in agriculture, despite the conflict level. However, subsistence agri-
culture is negative and significant (cols. 11-12), meaning that with high levels of conflict
some households give up cultivation if it is not the main source of subsistence – although
under conflict it does become the main source of income for many households (see baseline
estimations).
Third, the frequency of peace/conflict is overall a less precise estimator of household
PEA.
4.4.3 The Influence of Foreign Troops and Aid: Test with Military Events
not Perceived as Harmful for PEA
It is possible that some of the effect of PEA that we observe in the baseline estimation
is due to the presence of foreign armies, which demand for goods and services, and aid
programmes, for example run by NGOs. We check for military presence by building a vari-
able n noconflict that accounts for all military events recorded in the Afghan war diaries,
and which were not included among the ‘relevant’ events used to measure the intensity
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of conflict (n conflict) – listed in Table 5 of the Web Appendix. Basically, these are all
events that do not involve fire, and which the population would not perceive as harmful
for an economic activity. There is a large list of such events: convoys (an accompanying
and protecting force of troops/patrols), medical interventions, and surveillance actions are
three among the many examples. Assuming that NGOs are more likely to cluster close to
military troops, the n conflict variable is a proxy for any external intervention that may
stimulate PEA.
Results using n noconflict in the place of the “conflict” variable are found in Table
20.23 Indeed, non conflict activities conducted by foreign troops have a positive and
significant effect on the likelihood that households in the same cell-year have a small
business (cols. 1-2). The effect is three and a half time stronger than in the baseline
estimation: an increase of 100 events increases the likelihood that a households holds a
small business by 1.8 pp This indicates that it may not be the conflict activity per se that
induces more entrepreneurship in the form of small businesses, but the presence of troops.
Unfortunately we do not have the data to disentangle the two effects.
However, the presence of troops, without relevant conflicts, have no significant effect
on self employment, whether of lower or higher capital intensity (cols. 3-8) – if anything,
the coefficients have the opposite sign with respect to n conflict, and are of the same
magnitude.
Third, the positive effect on agriculture is confirmed significant (cols. 9-10), but in this
case it is driven by the sale of agricultural products (cols. 13-14), and not by subsistence
agriculture (cols. 11-12), although the effect o sale is poorly significant. As in the case of
small business, this may be due to the effect that foreign troops have on the demand of
agricultural products.
Overall, “non-relevant” military action, i.e. actions that do not generate direct de-
struction, seem to induce more commercial activity, but this has an effect only on small
businesses and agricultural sales. The effect of conflict estimated on other types of PEA
are not influenced by the military presence alone.
4.4.4 Expectation of Conflict Based on Past Cumulated Conflict Events
In order to account for the formation of adaptive expectations based on the years since
the beginning of the last conflict, using the GDELT data we build a variable cum conf
that, for each area, sums the number of material conflicts recorded since 2001 till the year
before the survey. For example, for households interviewed in 2005 cum conf is the sum
of material conflicts between 2001 and 2004 in the area were the household lives. Table
21 reports the results form the estimations.
The baseline results are overall robust to the use of the cumulative number of conflicts
(using the less precise GDELT data). However, a number of small differences add to the
overall result of this paper. First, the sum of past violence have no significant effect on more
formal small businesses. Taken together with the result discussed in the previous section,
this confirms that the main driver of the positive effect of conflict on small business is the
presence of military troops, not the number of relevant conflicts occurred in the previous
years.
Second, in areas where the conflict has been more intense for a number of consecutive
years the overall effect on self-employment is positive, due to the fact that the increase of
lower capital activities is stronger and more significant than the decrease in higher capital




Third, and related, with respect to the current and lagged conflict, the conflicts cu-
mulated since the beginning of the war (2001) have a much stronger role in increasing the
likelihood of households surviving on agriculture, and particularly on subsistence agricul-
ture (still no significant effect on the sale of agricultural goods, on which the presence of
military troops has a slightly significant effect).
Overall, the effect of the expectation on future conflict based on the sum of conflicts
since the beginning of the war reinforces the results of the paper: violent conflict pushes
households out of employment and more capital intensive self employment, toward low
capital intensive activities, and even more toward subsistence agriculture. Whereas it has
no effect on small businesses.
4.4.5 Further Robustness Checks
Finally, in this section we run a number of robustness checks to assess the consistency of
the results under different specifications and samplings.
First, we run the analysis for the period including the 2003 wave (results in Table
22). For this period we can use only two conflict indicators: intensity measured with the
number of events recorded by the media (n events4), and the percentage of households
that have experienced a violent shock in the are (p shockins). And we can analyse the
effect only on three aggregated types of PEA: business ownership (bus, cols. 1-2), self
employment in agriculture with no distinction between subsistence and sales (se agr, cols.
3-4) and self employment in non agriculture (se na, cols. 5-6).
The results largely confirm the corresponding results for the 2005-07/8 sample: no
significant effect of these conflict indicators on the available categories of PEA, and no
significant changes in the signs. The only relevant difference is that the lagged positive
effect of conflict intensity on self employment in non agricultural self employment is now
significant at the 5% level, reinforcing the results from the baseline estimations.
Second, we check a number of different functional forms of the conflict variables:
quadratic, hyperbolic and logarithmic. All transformations show extremely poor results.
Third, we introduce the rate of unemployment per cell-year Aunemp ratio as a de-
terminant of the choice of investing in a PEA. Although unemployment ratio is often a
significant determinant of PEA – positive for small business end self employment in non
agriculture and negative for self employment in agriculture – the effect of the conflict
variables is unchanged.
Fourth, we introduce the intensity of opium cultivation as the percentage of households
that earn income from any opium activity in the cell-year (perc opium act). By construc-
tion, high level of opium cultivation reduces the likelihood of PEA among household – it
is an alternative source of income. But the effect of conflict on PEA are unchanged.
Fifth, we analyse separately urban and rural samples. Focussing on the rural sample
the estimates loose precision. Not surprisingly, the impact of the conflict on civilians
(wk civil) is the variable which better explains the likelihood of a household holding a
PEA. But overall there are no significant changes in the main message, a part from the
capital intensity differences differences not significant anymore. In other words, conflict
seems to have less impact on the income choice in the country side, a part from when it
is perceived as number of civilians killed.
On the contrary, the baseline estimates are strengthened when we focus on the urban
population, although there are no major differences with respect to the main message. The
effect of conflict on self employment outside agriculture now becomes explicitly significant
and negative because the effect on lower capital intensive activities is no more significant,
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whereas the negative effect on higher capital intensive activities is negative and drives the
overall effect. The effect on agriculture self-employment is also significant, but, being in
urban areas, the effect is driven by sales of agricultural products, and not by subsistence
agriculture.
Sixth, we change the size of the area, using cells of 0.4 degrees, and the native districts.
In both cases results are less precise, as expected, but do not change.
Seventh, we re-estimate the baseline model without the households interviewed in 2007,
which is a small group of households interviewed in a different season, with a slightly
distribution of conflict events. Once more, the base line estimates are unchanged.
Finally, clustering the standard errors at the district level – rather than at the level of
the our smaller regular cells of approximately 33km width – have only a marginal effect
on the standard errors and in a few cases on the level of significance of the main results,
which remain unchanged.
5 Concluding Remarks
Entrepreneurship is a crucial driver of economic development and growth, both in devel-
oping and in industrialized economies. Violent conflict, conversely, is a clear obstacle to
economic development and growth, particularly in countries ragged by several decades of
conflict such as Afghanistan.
International Organizations and aid agencies may be interested in knowing more about
which kind of entrepreneurship is more resilient towards the obstacles that conflict and in-
security set on economic activities, as it could work as leverage for economic development,
during and in the aftermath of wars. Similarly they might be interested in which aspects
of the conflict plays the biggest role in hindering PEA – e.g. the intensity, frequency or
the impact on infrastructures and people lives.
However, the evidence of the empirical economic literature so far is, at best, mixed.
This is the case also because large part of the studies consider a generic entrepreneurial
activity, when they focus on the households, or formal firms; and they control for one
specific indicator of conflict, usually the impact in terms of number casualties.
We built a detailed and comprehensive dataset to carefully investigate the relation
between conflict and PEA in the context of Afghanistan. We matched two unique sources
of information – with a detail of precision along many different dimension (geographic
detail, type of economic activity, household background information, and type of conflict
events) and a comprehensiveness which are extremely rare in a developing country. The
dataset enabled us to assess how the households’ ‘choices’ with respect to the source of
income are affected by the conflict intensity in the area in which they live. Here we focused
on the choice to hold one type of private economic activity.
The results show that the probability that a household engages in PEA is, in general,
positively affected by the level of conflict, its impact, and to a lesser extent by its frequency.
However, the results are heterogeneous with respect to the type of activity and the conflict
indicator used.
Indeed, it is mainly less capital-intensive self employment activities – e.g. sales of
prepared food and petty trade – and activities related to subsistence agriculture, which
drive the positive relationship. More capital-intensive self employment activities requiring
higher fixed capital investments – e.g. milling and taxi driving – are instead negatively
affected by the intensity of the conflict. We find the same result looking at the effect
of conflict on the ownership of agricultural assets: households tend to own more land to
cultivate, but they have less capital equipment.
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Different measures of conflict have a positive effect also on more formal small busi-
nesses. However, in this case it is the presence of foreign troops in the area, which creates
economic opportunities, which dominates the positive effect.
The results also clearly show that the manifestation of conflict that play the stronger
role is the number of casualties among the civil population, followed by the intensity of
the conflict and, to a lesser extent, by its frequency. When the conflict measure is confined
to military casualties, there seem to be no significant effect.
All these results are remarkably stable across a number of different specifications and
robustness tests, and an instrumental variable approach aimed at double-checking the
direction of the causality links confirms the overall consistency of the baseline estimates.
However, it is worth noticing that the estimated effects are rather small in magnitude,
which in turn might suggest that empirical applications based on less precise data could
fail to properly estimate these effects.
All in all, we find evidence that conflict pushes households towards marginal self em-
ployment activities and towards agriculture, although a few households gain from doing
business with the foreign army. Thus, whereas the overall effect of conflict on the econ-
omy is likely to be negative, people tend to resume their course of life an hold on to their
entrepreneurial – some would say survival – capabilities.
Do our findings can be supportive of directing international aids to entrepreneurship in
conflict-ridden countries? We think so, for two reasons. Our results show that the causal
relation goes from conflict to entrepreneurship: it is resilient private economic activity –
self employment – which is driven by intensity, and not private economic activity which
attracts more conflict (at least at the scale of private economic activity that an Afghan
households holds). Second, and more speculatively, if financed, some of the entrepreneurial
activity may become a strong leverage for economic development as soon as a conflict
reduces in a specific area, even though it continues in other areas of the country. People
who are forced out from employment into self employment may become a source of future
development.
However, more importantly, our results do show that violent conflict, even when driven
by a foreign coalition, rewinds the slow process of structural change of a low income
country. If the conflict lasts long enough, such regression may require a long time before
the country can change direction again. If a conflict is already in place, our results show
that it is the “collateral” damages destroying the lives of civilians that has the strongest
effect on household’s decision to invest in a private economic activity of a given type.
“When we first arrived here, there was no coffee seller. And now, barely
five days later, he was back: life was resuming its old course, normality and
dailiness were returning. It is a beautiful and heartening thing, this obstinate,
heroic human striving for normality, this almost instinctive searching for it-
no matter what. Ordinary people here treat political cataclysms–coups d’e´tat,
military takeovers, revolutions, and wars-as phenomena belonging to the realm
of nature. They approach them with exactly the same apathetic resignation
and fatalism as they would a tempest. One can do nothing about them; one
must simply wait them out, hiding under the roof, peering out from time to
time to observe the sky–has the lightning ceased, are the clouds departing? If
yes, then one can step outside once again and resume that which was momen-
tarily interrupted–work, a journey, sitting in the sun.”
Ryszard Kapus´cin´ski (2001), The Shadow of the Sun, A. A. Knopf, New York, p83
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A Figure Appendix
Figure 1: Number of relevant conflicts recorded by the US army per district,
2005-2008. Conflicts are normalised by the district population.
Source: own computation based on AWD data.
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Figure 2: Number of conflicts recorded by the media per district, 2003-2008.
Conflicts are normalised by the district population.
Source: own computation based on GDELT data.
Figure 3: Number of total individuals wounded and killed recorded by the
US army per district, 2005-2008. Wounded and killed are normalised by the district
population.
Source: own computation based on AWD data.
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Figure 4: Number of U.S. soldiers wounded and killed recorded by the US army
per district, 2005-2008. Wounded and killed are normalised by the district population.
Source: own computation based on AWD data.
Figure 5: Number of civilians wounded and killed recorded by the US army per
district, 2005-2008. Wounded and killed are normalised by the district population.
Source: own computation based on AWD data.
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Figure 6: Number of insurgents wounded and killed recorded by the US army
per district, 2005-2008. Wounded and killed are normalised by the district population.
Source: own computation based on AWD data.
Figure 7: Percentage of days in a year in which there is no relevant conflict.
Density
Source: own computation based on AWD data.
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Figure 8: Percentage of households in a district that have experienced a shock
related to violence and insecurity in t− 1. Density
Source: own computation based on NRVA data.
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(a) Soviet conflict (1979-1989)
Source: own computation based on GDELT data.
(b) ISAF conflict (2004-2009 only)
Source: own computation based on AWD data.
(c) US Map of Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan
Source: Wikipedia
Figure 9: Geographical distribution of the Soviet (a-c) and the ISAF conflicts
(b). Maps 9a and 9b plot the averge number of relevant conflict events in each district
(post-2005 definitions of districts) during the periods of interest: 1979-1989 for the Soviet
conflcit (a) and 2004-2004 for the ISAF conflict (b). Due to differences in reporting be-
tween 30 years ago and recent years, the overall number of conflicts registered is clearly
different. However, the figure shows that both conflicts where spread throughout the coun-
try, although the average intensity might differ between districts. Map 9c plots the Soviet





Income source Self employment types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
se na Low K High K agric agr sub agr sale
Crop production for home con-
sumption
Yes Yes
Livestock production for home
consumption
Yes Yes
Production & sale of field crops Yes Yes
Prod & sales of cash crops (ex-
cept Opium)
Yes Yes
Prod & sales of orchard products Yes Yes
Prod & sales of livestock & prod-
ucts
Yes Yes
Sales of prepared foods Yes Yes
Miller Yes Yes
Petty trade/ shopkeeping Yes Yes
Cross border trade Yes Yes




Carpet weaving Yes Yes
Taxi/transport Yes Yes
Table 8: List of the sources of income considered as self-employment for 2005
and 2007/8
Source: own elaboration based on NRVA
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Control variables Description 2003
HHMemb2 = 1 if HH members are < 2 Yes
HHMemb5 = 1 if HH members are < 5 & > 2 Yes
HHMemb10 = 1 if HH members are < 10 & > 5 Yes
HHMemb15 = 1 if HH members are < 15 & > 10 Yes
HHMemb20 = 1 if HH members are < 20 & > 15 Yes
MaleH = 1 if the household head is a male Yes
AgeHH Age of the HH head Yes
GenderAvHH Average gender of the HH Yes
LiteracyH = 1 if the HH head is literate Yes
LiteracyAvHH Average literacy of the HH members Yes
hhassets Number of assets in the HH Yes
Rural = 1 if the HH lives in a rural area No
Credit Inst = 1 if the HH obtained credit the previous year: credit institution No
Credit Lender = 1 if the HH obtained credit the previous year: private lender No
Credit Inform = 1 if the HH obtained credit the previous year: informal source No
Credit Other = 1 if the HH obtained credit the previous year: other sources No
Credit None = 1 if the HH did not obtain credit the previous year No
Loan = 1 if the HH obtained credit the previous year No
HHMigration = 1 if any HH member migrated the previous year Yes
shocks = 1 if the HH experienced a shock in the previous year Yes
Dremittances = 1 if the HH received remittance the previous year No
DSocialContr = 1 if the HH received any social aid the previous year No
RoadKm Km from the closest road No
DElectrNo = 1 if the HH has no access to electricity No
DMkt Close = 1 if the HH is close to the market No
Aunemp ratio % of unemployed adults (older than 13) in the cell Yes
perc opium act % of households cultivating opium in the cell No
Table 9: Control variables availability across waves. All the variables were available
for 2005-2007/8. Variables available for 2003 are indicated in the last column
Source: own elaboration based on NRVA
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B.2 Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent variables. See definition in Table 1
bus 0.038 0.192 0 1 47343
se na 0.131 0.338 0 1 47343
Low K 0.084 0.277 0 1 47343
High K 0.047 0.212 0 1 47343
agric 0.353 0.478 0 1 47343
agr sub 0.253 0.434 0 1 47343
agr sale 0.1 0.3 0 1 47343
Conflict variables. See definition in Table 2
n conflict 13.175 51.053 0 713 1180
n wk 14.521 49.359 0 855 1180
n wk usa 2.262 7.996 0 123 1180
n wk ins 4.557 24.989 0 654 1180
n wk civ 4.02 18.355 0 402 1180
peace days 0.972 0.081 0.101 1 1180
p shockins 0.104 0.22 0 1 1178
n event4 4.831 13.837 0 124 1181
n noconflict 9.636 38.672 0 809 1180
cum conf 49.789 91.92 0 384
Control variables. See definition in Table 9
HHMemb2 0.024 0.153 0 1 48519
HHMemb5 0.243 0.429 0 1 48519
HHMemb10 0.613 0.487 0 1 48519
HHMemb15 0.101 0.301 0 1 48519
HHMemb20 0.016 0.127 0 1 48519
MaleH 0.98 0.14 0 1 46403
AgeHH 43.335 13.358 1 99 45993
GenderAvHH 0.693 0.461 0 1 48519
LiteracyH 0.183 0.387 0 1 46404
LiteracyAvHH 0.266 0.277 0 1 48496
hhassets 2.356 1.849 0 7 48519
hhasset2 8.968 12.798 0 49 48519
Rural 0.788 0.409 0 1 48311
Credit Other 0.007 0.082 0 1 46757
Credit Inst 0.009 0.097 0 1 46757
Credit Lender 0.159 0.366 0 1 46547
Credit Inform 0.737 0.44 0 1 46757
Credit None 0.073 0.261 0 1 46757
Loan 0.467 0.499 0 1 48021
HHMigration 0.538 0.499 0 1 48465
shocks 0.488 0.5 0 1 48519
Dremittances 0.061 0.239 0 1 48519
DSocialContr 0.009 0.097 0 1 48515
RoadKm 3.426 13.337 0 602 47455
RoadKm2 189.594 5312.043 0 362404 47455
DMkt Close 0.404 0.491 0 1 47842
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DElectrNo 0.675 0.468 0 1 47788
perc opium act .07 .21 0 1 48527
Aunemp ratio 0.358 0.173 0 1 1181
Number of agricultural assets. See definitions in Section 4.2
n agrica1 6.899 17.809 0 445 50728
n agrica2 0.152 0.518 0 2 50728
n agrica3 0.457 0.498 0 1 50728
Table 10: Summary statistics of the variables used for the pooled regressions
2005-2008.
Source: own computation based on NRVA, AWD, and GDELT
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent variables. See definition in Table 1
bus 0.035 0.183 0 1 57948
agric 0.348 0.476 0 1 57823
se na 0.126 0.332 0 1 57823
Conflict variables. See definition in Table 2
n event4 4.607 13.844 0 124 631
p shockins 0.126 0.247 0 1 630
Control variables. See definition in Table 9
HHMemb2 0.02 0.139 0 1 60154
HHMemb5 0.224 0.417 0 1 60154
HHMemb10 0.651 0.477 0 1 60154
HHMemb15 0.09 0.285 0 1 60154
HHMemb20 0.013 0.115 0 1 60154
MaleH 0.96 0.196 0 1 57248
AgeHH 43.429 12.916 1 99 56810
GenderAvHH 0.674 0.469 0 1 60154
LiteracyH 0.18 0.384 0 1 57124
LiteracyAvHH 0.266 0.277 0 1 48496
hhassets 2.06 1.81 0 7 60156
hhasset2 7.516 11.925 0 49 60156
HHMigration 0.463 0.499 0 1 59963
shocks 0.517 0.5 0 1 59858
Number of agricultural assets. See definitions in Section 4.2
n agrica1 7.514 19.516 0 445 62368
n agrica3 0.471 0.499 0 1 62368
Table 11: Summary statistics of the variables used for the pooled regressions
2003-2008.
Source: own computation based on NRVA and GDELT
42
B.3 Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
bus (1) 1.00
se na (2) -0.08∗∗∗ 1.00
Low K (3) -0.06∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 1.00
High K (4) -0.04∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ 1.00
agric (5) -0.15∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ 1.00
agr sub (6) -0.12∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 1.00
agr sale (7) -0.07∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ 1.00
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
See Section 3.1.1 for variables definitions.
Table 12: Spearman Rank Correlations: PEA types





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES n agrica1 n agrica1 n agrica2 n agrica2 n agrica3 n agrica3
n wk 2.477** 0.953 -0.087 -0.147 0.070 -0.021
(1.208) (1.945) (0.097) (0.147) (0.077) (0.108)
l1 n wk 2.034 0.080 0.122
(2.238) (0.125) (0.084)
R-squared 0.185 0.185 0.826 0.826 0.308 0.308
n wk usa -1.781 -8.004 0.961 1.087 1.112 0.777
(23.862) (22.871) (0.899) (0.707) (1.138) (1.051)
l1 n wk usa 17.273 -0.350 0.928*
(15.742) (0.849) (0.511)
R-squared 0.185 0.185 0.826 0.826 0.308 0.309
n wk ins 2.353 1.022 0.605** 0.491** 0.420** 0.279
(5.957) (6.037) (0.240) (0.231) (0.184) (0.174)
l1 n wk ins 4.084 0.350** 0.433***
(4.769) (0.138) (0.100)
R-squared 0.185 0.185 0.826 0.826 0.308 0.309
n wk civ 3.662*** 2.484 -0.226*** -0.206 0.065 0.203***
(1.271) (1.653) (0.050) (0.179) (0.065) (0.066)
l1 n wk civ 2.391 -0.040 -0.281*
(3.284) (0.334) (0.164)
R-squared 0.185 0.185 0.826 0.826 0.308 0.308
n event4 28.965** 23.629 -0.961 -0.681 0.498 0.096
(14.409) (15.387) (0.663) (0.743) (0.620) (0.766)
l1 n event4 11.369 -0.596 0.857
(16.246) (0.905) (0.897)
R-squared 0.185 0.185 0.826 0.826 0.308 0.308
perc ShockInsec 0.682 1.705 0.011 -0.043 -0.062 -0.145*
(2.137) (2.161) (0.045) (0.055) (0.062) (0.076)
l1 perc ShockInsec -1.296 0.042 0.072
(1.619) (0.044) (0.055)
R-squared 0.185 0.180 0.826 0.806 0.308 0.313
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41,391 41,391 41,391 41,391 41,391 41,391
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the cell p.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are count (n agrica1 and n agrica2) and dummy (n agrica3) variables defined
at the household level specifying the number of agricultural asset of the household (livestock or capital)
and the ownership of land. The equation is estimated with a linear model (OLS). Conflict measures are
computed at the cell level (see Table 2 for definitions). All conflict measures, except for peace days and
p shockins, are divided by 1000. All equations are estimated with the control variables described in Tab.
9, year and cell fixed effects.
Table 16: LPM Pooled cross-section estimates of conflict on the number of
agricultural assets (2005-2008)
Source: own computation based on NRVA, AWD, and GDELT
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
VARIABLES bus bus se na se na Low K Low K High K High K agric agric agr sub agr sub agr sale agr sale
n conflict 0.048** 0.023 0.049 0.036 0.070* 0.043 -0.020 -0.007 0.143* 0.103 0.066 0.027 0.076 0.076
(0.019) (0.016) (0.038) (0.040) (0.036) (0.033) (0.013) (0.013) (0.077) (0.080) (0.068) (0.064) (0.076) (0.085)
l1 n conflict 0.047*** 0.027 0.053*** -0.027 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.001
(0.017) (0.023) (0.010) (0.020) (0.029) (0.021) (0.025)
DMkt Close 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.023* -0.023* -0.012 -0.012
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
IMkt 0.004 0.011 -0.052 -0.048 -0.006 0.002 -0.046** -0.050** 0.022 0.033 0.072 0.083 -0.050 -0.050
(0.015) (0.014) (0.040) (0.041) (0.029) (0.029) (0.021) (0.022) (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.058) (0.066) (0.068)
R-squared 0.058 0.059 0.130 0.130 0.100 0.100 0.053 0.053 0.253 0.254 0.249 0.249 0.173 0.173
n wk 0.054** 0.025 0.065** 0.035 0.113*** 0.101 -0.048** -0.065** 0.143** 0.085 0.097 0.097 0.046 -0.012
(0.024) (0.026) (0.030) (0.064) (0.023) (0.063) (0.021) (0.032) (0.061) (0.099) (0.069) (0.097) (0.037) (0.061)
l1 n wk 0.037 0.038 0.016 0.022 0.075 -0.001 0.075
(0.026) (0.079) (0.075) (0.032) (0.089) (0.087) (0.067)
DMkt Close 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.021* -0.021* -0.014* -0.014*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
IMkt 0.003 0.006 -0.071 -0.068 -0.017 -0.015 -0.054 -0.052 0.040 0.046 0.035 0.035 0.005 0.011
(0.021) (0.020) (0.054) (0.050) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.053) (0.052) (0.044) (0.044) (0.035) (0.034)
R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.130 0.130 0.100 0.100 0.054 0.054 0.253 0.253 0.249 0.249 0.173 0.173
n wk usa 0.266 0.132 0.491 0.269 0.127 -0.199 0.364 0.469 -0.262 -0.736 -0.283 -0.590 0.021 -0.146
(0.286) (0.275) (0.621) (0.596) (0.494) (0.474) (0.371) (0.357) (1.003) (1.108) (1.073) (1.089) (0.550) (0.557)
l1 n wk usa 0.312 0.513 0.756* -0.243 1.100 0.713 0.387
(0.240) (0.389) (0.411) (0.363) (0.850) (0.701) (0.434)
DMkt Close 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.001 -0.031** -0.032** -0.018 -0.018 -0.013 -0.013
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
IMkt -0.076 0.020 -1.731** -1.573** -0.760 -0.528 -0.970*** -1.045*** -0.788 -0.451 -0.561 -0.342 -0.228 -0.109
(0.368) (0.378) (0.705) (0.661) (0.573) (0.544) (0.314) (0.295) (1.147) (1.200) (0.854) (0.934) (0.678) (0.663)
R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.131 0.131 0.099 0.100 0.053 0.053 0.253 0.253 0.248 0.248 0.172 0.172
n wk ins 0.028 0.022 -0.036 0.044 -0.073 -0.011 0.037 0.055 -0.597*** -0.700*** -0.555** -0.566** -0.042 -0.133
(0.070) (0.062) (0.213) (0.232) (0.176) (0.194) (0.167) (0.173) (0.224) (0.224) (0.253) (0.238) (0.261) (0.247)
l1 n wk ins 0.010 -0.137** -0.106 -0.031 0.176* 0.020 0.156
(0.034) (0.068) (0.068) (0.049) (0.103) (0.128) (0.105)
DMkt Close 0.005 0.005 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.021* -0.021* -0.016* -0.016**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
IMkt -0.046 -0.041 0.024 -0.046 0.295* 0.242 -0.272 -0.288 0.555 0.644 0.256 0.266 0.298 0.378
(0.058) (0.053) (0.121) (0.128) (0.179) (0.171) (0.199) (0.202) (0.493) (0.491) (0.215) (0.231) (0.429) (0.402)
R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.130 0.130 0.099 0.100 0.053 0.053 0.253 0.253 0.249 0.249 0.173 0.173
n wk civ 0.081*** 0.040 0.058** -0.094 0.158*** 0.032 -0.100*** -0.126*** 0.261*** 0.200** 0.190*** 0.207 0.071 -0.007
(0.026) (0.048) (0.029) (0.092) (0.022) (0.074) (0.018) (0.035) (0.068) (0.091) (0.047) (0.129) (0.052) (0.081)
l1 n wk civ 0.084 0.312* 0.257* 0.054 0.125 -0.035 0.160
(0.082) (0.185) (0.153) (0.061) (0.186) (0.275) (0.190)
DMkt Close 0.005 0.005 -0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.021* -0.021* -0.013 -0.013
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
IMkt 0.011 0.010 -0.073 -0.074 -0.044 -0.045 -0.029 -0.029 0.028 0.027 0.056 0.057 -0.029 -0.030
(0.033) (0.035) (0.093) (0.086) (0.068) (0.062) (0.031) (0.030) (0.074) (0.072) (0.062) (0.063) (0.037) (0.036)
R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.130 0.130 0.100 0.100 0.054 0.054 0.254 0.254 0.249 0.249 0.172 0.173
n event4 -0.145 0.014 0.517 0.500 0.582* 0.598* -0.065 -0.098 1.015 0.409 0.113 -0.490 0.901** 0.898**
(0.562) (0.459) (0.371) (0.434) (0.330) (0.334) (0.357) (0.375) (1.120) (1.062) (0.918) (0.926) (0.427) (0.380)
l1 n event4 -0.345 0.037 -0.035 0.072 1.318* 1.311* 0.007
(0.479) (0.437) (0.418) (0.284) (0.780) (0.702) (0.474)
DMkt Close 0.008** 0.008** 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.030** -0.032** -0.016 -0.018 -0.014* -0.014*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
IMkt -0.180 -0.219 -0.227 -0.222 -0.202 -0.206 -0.025 -0.016 -0.164 -0.016 -0.269 -0.121 0.104 0.105
(0.119) (0.136) (0.210) (0.211) (0.221) (0.201) (0.155) (0.145) (0.291) (0.275) (0.239) (0.251) (0.145) (0.148)
R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.130 0.130 0.100 0.100 0.053 0.053 0.253 0.254 0.248 0.249 0.173 0.173
p shockins -0.000 0.016 -0.053 -0.029 -0.017 0.015 -0.036** -0.044* 0.132* 0.090 -0.000 -0.049 0.132** 0.139**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.033) (0.047) (0.026) (0.039) (0.017) (0.025) (0.079) (0.096) (0.071) (0.092) (0.053) (0.061)
l1 p shockins -0.003 -0.044 -0.039 -0.005 0.082 0.038 0.044
(0.019) (0.033) (0.031) (0.019) (0.071) (0.072) (0.053)
DMkt Close 0.006 0.003 -0.008 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.033** -0.022 -0.018 -0.008 -0.015* -0.014
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009)
IMkt -0.011 -0.007 0.083*** 0.094*** 0.083*** 0.097** -0.000 -0.004 -0.050 -0.112 -0.036 -0.094 -0.015 -0.018
(0.016) (0.018) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.038) (0.019) (0.023) (0.082) (0.091) (0.068) (0.074) (0.054) (0.064)
R-squared 0.058 0.055 0.130 0.129 0.100 0.099 0.053 0.051 0.254 0.259 0.248 0.251 0.174 0.172
peace days -0.048** -0.015 -0.047 -0.015 -0.059 -0.027 0.012 0.013 -0.109 -0.084 -0.040 -0.006 -0.069 -0.078
(0.020) (0.020) (0.034) (0.036) (0.040) (0.034) (0.021) (0.013) (0.092) (0.089) (0.086) (0.079) (0.060) (0.067)
l1 peace days -0.054*** -0.052 -0.051*** -0.001 -0.042 -0.056* 0.014
(0.020) (0.042) (0.016) (0.034) (0.043) (0.031) (0.028)
DMkt Close 0.004 0.010 -0.039 -0.033 0.014 0.020 -0.053** -0.052** 0.019 0.024 0.059 0.065 -0.040 -0.041
(0.014) (0.014) (0.036) (0.035) (0.030) (0.030) (0.025) (0.023) (0.063) (0.062) (0.059) (0.059) (0.050) (0.051)
IMkt 0.001 -0.005 0.039 0.033 -0.012 -0.018 0.052** 0.052** -0.056 -0.061 -0.084 -0.090 0.028 0.029
(0.016) (0.015) (0.037) (0.037) (0.031) (0.032) (0.026) (0.024) (0.066) (0.065) (0.062) (0.062) (0.053) (0.055)
R-squared 0.058 0.059 0.130 0.130 0.100 0.100 0.053 0.053 0.253 0.253 0.249 0.249 0.173 0.173
Cells F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the cell p.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables defined at the household level specifying the type of activity of the household (see Table 1 for definitions). Conflict
measures are computed at the cell level (see Table 2 for definitions). All conflict measures, except for peace days and p shockins, are divided by 1000. All equations
are estimated with the control variables described in Tab. 9, year and cell fixed effects.
Table 17: LPM pooled cross-section estimates of conflict effect on PEA (2005-
2008). Interaction between conflict measures and the distance from the market.
Source: own computation based on NRVA, AWD, and GDELT
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
VARIABLES bus bus se na se na Low K Low K High K High K agric agric agr sub agr sub agr sale agr sale
n conflict 0.049*** 0.027** 0.032 0.019 0.067** 0.043* -0.035** -0.024** 0.140** 0.106* 0.093* 0.060 0.046 0.046
(0.015) (0.012) (0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.014) (0.011) (0.060) (0.063) (0.050) (0.047) (0.052) (0.059)
l1 n conflict 0.047*** 0.029 0.053*** -0.024 0.075** 0.074*** 0.001
(0.018) (0.024) (0.011) (0.020) (0.030) (0.021) (0.024)
RoadKm -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IRoad 0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.005* -0.005 0.021 0.020 -0.001 -0.001 0.022** 0.022**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
R-squared 0.058 0.059 0.130 0.130 0.100 0.100 0.053 0.053 0.254 0.254 0.249 0.249 0.173 0.173
n wk 0.053*** 0.028 0.037 0.007 0.104*** 0.095 -0.067*** -0.089*** 0.149** 0.109 0.109* 0.113 0.040 -0.004
(0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.069) (0.023) (0.068) (0.015) (0.031) (0.059) (0.097) (0.063) (0.098) (0.032) (0.064)
l1 n wk 0.034 0.041 0.012 0.030 0.055 -0.005 0.060
(0.027) (0.083) (0.078) (0.034) (0.090) (0.089) (0.067)
RoadKm -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IRoad 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 -0.001 -0.002 0.016 0.015 0.001 0.001 0.016 0.015
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.130 0.130 0.100 0.100 0.053 0.053 0.253 0.254 0.249 0.249 0.173 0.173
n wk usa 0.275 0.167 0.091 -0.132 -0.033 -0.308 0.125 0.176 -0.648 -1.003 -0.432 -0.681 -0.216 -0.322
(0.255) (0.244) (0.523) (0.511) (0.429) (0.430) (0.329) (0.303) (1.081) (1.136) (1.049) (1.043) (0.488) (0.510)
l1 n wk usa 0.326 0.671* 0.823** -0.152 1.064 0.746 0.318
(0.232) (0.404) (0.413) (0.360) (0.855) (0.669) (0.444)
RoadKm -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IRoad -0.017 -0.022 -0.018 -0.027 -0.017 -0.028 -0.001 0.001 0.117 0.103 0.006 -0.004 0.111 0.107
(0.013) (0.014) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.029) (0.020) (0.021) (0.072) (0.076) (0.054) (0.059) (0.086) (0.087)
R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.130 0.130 0.099 0.100 0.053 0.053 0.253 0.253 0.248 0.248 0.173 0.173
n wk ins -0.007 -0.008 -0.052 -0.011 0.051 0.091 -0.103 -0.102 -0.342 -0.365 -0.404* -0.408** 0.062 0.042
(0.050) (0.046) (0.183) (0.186) (0.223) (0.226) (0.103) (0.104) (0.314) (0.310) (0.220) (0.205) (0.166) (0.175)
l1 n wk ins 0.003 -0.176** -0.168*** -0.008 0.100 0.018 0.082
(0.037) (0.069) (0.061) (0.051) (0.129) (0.138) (0.093)
RoadKm -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IRoad 0.008 0.008 0.020 0.031** 0.019 0.030*** 0.001 0.001 0.020 0.013 -0.014 -0.016 0.034 0.029
(0.007) (0.008) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.041) (0.043) (0.013) (0.017) (0.037) (0.035)
R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.130 0.130 0.099 0.100 0.053 0.053 0.253 0.253 0.249 0.249 0.173 0.173
n wk civ 0.082*** 0.041 0.030 -0.123 0.138*** 0.011 -0.108*** -0.134*** 0.254*** 0.189** 0.199*** 0.213 0.056 -0.024
(0.023) (0.052) (0.032) (0.110) (0.023) (0.088) (0.019) (0.038) (0.054) (0.096) (0.042) (0.138) (0.039) (0.083)
l1 n wk civ 0.085 0.312* 0.259* 0.053 0.133 -0.029 0.162
(0.082) (0.188) (0.154) (0.062) (0.185) (0.276) (0.191)
RoadKm -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IRoad 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.011 0.015 0.015 -0.005 -0.005 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.034** 0.034** 0.018 0.018
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.130 0.130 0.100 0.100 0.054 0.054 0.254 0.254 0.249 0.249 0.173 0.173
n event4 -0.131 -0.022 0.533 0.463 0.595* 0.563 -0.063 -0.101 1.021 0.405 0.131 -0.510 0.890** 0.915**
(0.563) (0.481) (0.370) (0.457) (0.324) (0.355) (0.359) (0.377) (1.122) (1.057) (0.912) (0.913) (0.428) (0.380)
l1 n event4 -0.232 0.151 0.069 0.082 1.321* 1.373** -0.052
(0.467) (0.444) (0.482) (0.306) (0.790) (0.672) (0.468)
RoadKm 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IRoad -0.017* -0.017* -0.012 -0.013 -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 0.020 0.018 -0.007 -0.009 0.027 0.027
(0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.048) (0.049) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.040)
R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.130 0.130 0.100 0.100 0.053 0.053 0.253 0.254 0.248 0.249 0.173 0.173
p shockins -0.004 0.014 -0.027 0.008 0.013 0.057 -0.040** -0.048* 0.101 0.033 -0.023 -0.097 0.125*** 0.130**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.034) (0.047) (0.026) (0.035) (0.019) (0.027) (0.071) (0.089) (0.062) (0.080) (0.046) (0.054)
l1 p shockins -0.003 -0.052 -0.049 -0.003 0.095 0.049 0.046
(0.018) (0.032) (0.030) (0.019) (0.072) (0.073) (0.054)
RoadKm -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IRoad -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.004** 0.004*** 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R-squared 0.058 0.055 0.130 0.129 0.099 0.099 0.053 0.051 0.254 0.259 0.248 0.251 0.174 0.172
peace days -0.048*** -0.016 -0.039 -0.007 -0.063* -0.034 0.025 0.027* -0.120 -0.098 -0.069 -0.039 -0.051 -0.059
(0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.027) (0.034) (0.028) (0.023) (0.016) (0.076) (0.072) (0.071) (0.063) (0.048) (0.054)
l1 peace days -0.054*** -0.055 -0.050*** -0.004 -0.038 -0.051 0.013
(0.020) (0.042) (0.017) (0.035) (0.045) (0.032) (0.027)
RoadKm -0.004 0.014 -0.027 0.008 0.013 0.057 -0.040** -0.048* 0.101 0.033 -0.023 -0.097 0.125*** 0.130**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.034) (0.047) (0.026) (0.035) (0.019) (0.027) (0.071) (0.089) (0.062) (0.080) (0.046) (0.054)
IRoad -0.000 -0.000 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.007 -0.007 0.005 0.005 -0.013* -0.013*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
R-squared 0.058 0.059 0.130 0.130 0.100 0.100 0.053 0.053 0.253 0.253 0.248 0.249 0.173 0.173
Cells F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls
Observations 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the cell p.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables defined at the household level specifying the type of activity of the household (see Table 1 for definitions). Conflict
measures are computed at the cell level (see Table 2 for definitions). All conflict measures, except for peace days and p shockins, are divided by 1000. All equations
are estimated with the control variables described in Tab. 9, year and cell fixed effects.
Table 18: LPM pooled cross-section estimates of conflict effect on PEA (2005-
2008). Interaction between conflict measures and distance from the main road.
Source: own computation based on NRVA, AWD, and GDELT
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
VARIABLES bus bus se na se na Low K Low K High K High K agric agric agr sub agr sub agr sale agr sale
n conflict 0.070*** 0.042*** -0.044* -0.016 0.011 0.027 -0.048** -0.040*** 0.038 0.032 -0.124*** -0.074** 0.025 0.008
(0.016) (0.014) (0.023) (0.022) (0.029) (0.024) (0.021) (0.014) (0.097) (0.082) (0.042) (0.037) (0.059) (0.063)
l1 n conflict 0.060*** -0.062*** -0.036 -0.018 0.013 -0.110 0.036
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023) (0.046) (0.067) (0.023)
R-squared 0.076 0.077 0.118 0.119 0.116 0.116 0.050 0.050 0.289 0.289 0.287 0.287 0.178 0.178
n wk 0.080*** 0.004 -0.077*** -0.059 0.001 0.030 -0.071*** -0.092** -0.004 -0.158* -0.208*** -0.237*** 0.010 -0.144*
(0.022) (0.036) (0.027) (0.061) (0.032) (0.059) (0.023) (0.041) (0.077) (0.093) (0.056) (0.088) (0.039) (0.075)
l1 n wk 0.102** -0.024 -0.039 0.029 0.206*** 0.039 0.206**
(0.040) (0.069) (0.053) (0.044) (0.072) (0.111) (0.082)
R-squared 0.076 0.077 0.118 0.118 0.116 0.116 0.050 0.050 0.288 0.289 0.287 0.287 0.178 0.178
n wk usa 0.328 0.094 -0.008 0.047 -0.183 -0.125 0.096 0.066 0.816 0.387 0.215 0.204 -0.731 -0.817
(0.264) (0.251) (0.617) (0.569) (0.494) (0.465) (0.477) (0.397) (0.914) (0.793) (0.693) (0.768) (0.804) (0.873)
l1 n wk usa 0.659** -0.154 -0.163 0.084 1.213 0.031 0.243
(0.263) (0.504) (0.221) (0.468) (0.805) (1.348) (0.603)
R-squared 0.076 0.076 0.118 0.118 0.116 0.116 0.049 0.049 0.289 0.289 0.286 0.286 0.178 0.178
n wk ins 0.002 -0.022 -0.134 -0.089 -0.095 -0.057 -0.087 -0.080 0.462* 0.348 -0.123 -0.166 -0.171 -0.270
(0.100) (0.100) (0.201) (0.193) (0.201) (0.203) (0.097) (0.093) (0.256) (0.247) (0.227) (0.219) (0.255) (0.265)
l1 n wk ins 0.072* -0.137 -0.117* -0.020 0.352*** 0.131 0.306***
(0.039) (0.121) (0.065) (0.077) (0.091) (0.117) (0.093)
R-squared 0.076 0.076 0.118 0.118 0.116 0.116 0.049 0.049 0.289 0.289 0.286 0.286 0.178 0.178
n wk civ 0.118*** 0.012 -0.139*** -0.189** -0.007 -0.077 -0.115*** -0.100 -0.055 -0.144* -0.338*** -0.317* 0.073 -0.046
(0.023) (0.038) (0.038) (0.093) (0.035) (0.066) (0.022) (0.062) (0.068) (0.083) (0.053) (0.168) (0.046) (0.123)
l1 n wk civ 0.217*** 0.100 0.143 -0.030 0.181 -0.042 0.244
(0.071) (0.157) (0.123) (0.105) (0.214) (0.322) (0.281)
R-squared 0.076 0.077 0.119 0.119 0.116 0.116 0.050 0.050 0.289 0.289 0.287 0.287 0.178 0.178
n event4 0.480 0.547 0.210 0.109 0.287 0.313 -0.049 -0.280 0.134 -0.391 -0.999 -1.274 0.240 0.220
(0.468) (0.438) (0.514) (0.520) (0.361) (0.448) (0.466) (0.553) (0.690) (0.712) (0.913) (0.842) (0.515) (0.537)
l1 n event4 -0.144 0.215 -0.056 0.496 1.124 0.588 0.043
(0.496) (0.447) (0.437) (0.607) (0.936) (0.852) (0.732)
R-squared 0.076 0.076 0.118 0.118 0.116 0.116 0.049 0.050 0.288 0.289 0.286 0.287 0.178 0.178
perc ShockInsec -0.018 -0.002 -0.068* -0.041 -0.001 0.071** -0.071** -0.117*** 0.070 0.001 -0.036 -0.092 0.158** 0.212***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.036) (0.051) (0.028) (0.034) (0.029) (0.040) (0.074) (0.089) (0.080) (0.105) (0.066) (0.074)
l1 perc ShockInsec -0.015 -0.042 -0.072** 0.025 0.149*** 0.160** 0.073
(0.028) (0.034) (0.031) (0.028) (0.055) (0.064) (0.082)
R-squared 0.076 0.066 0.119 0.116 0.116 0.113 0.050 0.050 0.289 0.291 0.286 0.291 0.179 0.179
peace days -0.075*** -0.035* 0.035 0.009 0.004 -0.025 0.027 0.032 -0.064 -0.035 0.114* 0.093** -0.031 -0.027
(0.019) (0.018) (0.027) (0.026) (0.031) (0.030) (0.034) (0.020) (0.095) (0.077) (0.065) (0.046) (0.058) (0.065)
l1 peace days -0.068*** 0.045 0.049** -0.009 -0.050 0.036 -0.006
(0.020) (0.035) (0.022) (0.033) (0.059) (0.097) (0.043)
R-squared 0.076 0.077 0.118 0.118 0.116 0.116 0.049 0.049 0.289 0.289 0.287 0.287 0.178 0.178
Cells F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 40,623 40,623 40,623 40,623 40,623 40,623 40,623 40,623 40,623 40,623 40,623 40,623 40,623 40,623
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the cell p.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables defined at the household level specifying the type of activity of the household (see Table 1 for definitions). Conflict measures
are computed at the cell level (see Table 2 for definitions). All conflict measures, except for peace days and p shockins, are divided by 1000. All equations are estimated with
the control variables described in Tab. 9, year and cell fixed effects.
Table 19: LPM pooled cross-section estimates of conflict effect on PEA (2005-
2008). A households is defined as entrepreneurial when a PEA contributes to the house-
hold income at any level of income.
Source: own computation based on NRVA, AWD, and GDELT
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
VARIABLES bus bus se na se na Low K Low K High K High K agric agric agr sub agr sub agr sale agr sale
nn noconflict 0.176** 0.161*** 0.036 0.036 0.001 0.003 0.035 0.033 0.430** 0.421** 0.220 0.210 0.210 0.211*
(0.089) (0.053) (0.117) (0.112) (0.155) (0.153) (0.099) (0.097) (0.188) (0.182) (0.193) (0.180) (0.135) (0.127)
l1 nn noconflict 0.144*** 0.008 -0.014 0.021 0.090 0.091 -0.002
(0.028) (0.053) (0.049) (0.039) (0.173) (0.112) (0.080)
R-squared 0.058 0.059 0.130 0.130 0.099 0.099 0.053 0.053 0.253 0.254 0.248 0.249 0.173 0.173
Cells F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the cell p.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables defined at the household level specifying the type of activity of the household (see Table 1 for definitions).
The no-conflict measures is computed at the level of the cell and divided by 1000. It mainly accounts for events recorded by the US Army in the war
diaries, and which do not involve firing. All equations are estimated with the control variables described in Tab. 9, year and cell fixed effects.
Table 20: LPM pooled cross-section estimates of the presence of troops on PEA
(2005-2008).
Source: own computation based on NRVA and AWD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES bus se na Low K High K agric agr sub agr sale
ncum conf 0.0566 0.249** 0.355*** -0.106* 0.485*** 0.434*** 0.0509
(0.0868) (0.122) (0.0783) (0.0622) (0.150) (0.130) (0.0793)
Constant 0.0669*** 0.304*** 0.179*** 0.125*** 0.0430 0.0744 -0.0314
(0.0196) (0.0393) (0.0335) (0.0281) (0.0667) (0.0611) (0.0315)
R-squared 0.058 0.131 0.101 0.053 0.254 0.249 0.172
Cells F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672 40,672
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the cell p.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables defined at the household level specifying the type of
activity of the household (see Table 1 for definitions). The conflict measure is the sum of material
events in the same are from 2001 until the year before the household is surveyed. All equations are
estimated with the control variables described in Tab. 9, year and cell fixed effects.
Table 21: OLS pooled cross-section estimates of cumulative conflict (since 2001)
on PEA (2005-2008)
Source: own computation based on NRVA and GDELT
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES bus bus agric agric se na se na
n event4 0.076 0.087 0.191 0.497 0.540 0.131
(0.357) (0.309) (0.748) (0.782) (0.357) (0.433)
l1 n event4 -0.025 -0.709 0.946**
(0.250) (0.603) (0.380)
R-squared 0.046 0.049 0.187 0.227 0.091 0.107
perc ShockInsec -0.004 0.086 -0.032
(0.011) (0.059) (0.028)
R-squared 0.046 0.187 0.091
Cells F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 53,941 53,941 53,941 53,941 53,941 53,941
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the cell p.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables defined at the household level spec-
ifying the type of activity of the household (see Table 1 for definitions). Conflict
measures are computed at the cell level (see Table 2 for definitions). All conflict mea-
sures, except for peace days and p shockins, are divided by 1000. All equations are
estimated with the control variables described in Tab. 9, year and cell fixed effects.
Table 22: LPM pooled cross-section estimates of conflict effect on PEA (2003-
2008).
Source: own computation based on NRVA and GDELT
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES n agrica1 n agrica1 n agrica3 n agrica3
n event4 17.002 22.788 -0.615 0.255
(16.632) (18.588) (0.912) (0.940)
l1 n event4 -13.589 -2.043**
(13.069) (0.864)
R-squared 0.130 0.130 0.237 0.237
perc ShockInsec 1.357 -0.044
(1.826) (0.057)
R-squared 0.130 0.237
Cells F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 55,752 55,752 55,752 55,752
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the
cell p.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are count (n agrica1 and n agrica2) and
dummy (n agrica3) variables defined at the household level specifying
the number of agricultural asset of the household (livestock or capital)
and the ownership of land. The equation is estimated with a linear
model (OLS). Conflict measures are computed at the cell level (see Ta-
ble 2 for definitions). All conflict measures, except for peace days and
p shockins, are divided by 1000. All equations are estimated with the
control variables described in Tab. 9, year and cell fixed effects.
Table 23: LPM pooled cross-section estimates of conflict effect on agricultural
assets (2003-2008).
Source: own computation based on NRVA and GDELT
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